Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to deonmenezes/mantishack. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/deonmenezes/mantishack/main/.codex/skills/http-evidence/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/deonmenezes/mantishackWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/deonmenezes/mantishack/http-evidence)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/deonmenezes/mantishack/http-evidence"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/deonmenezes/mantishack/http-evidence/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/deonmenezes/mantishack/http-evidence"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/deonmenezes/mantishack/http-evidence.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector pass
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00043 | $0.00417 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00017 | $0.00167 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00083 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00042 |
Grade A, and why
http-evidence scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
Use http_audit (mantis_http_audit MCP server) whenever you have a captured HTTP exchange that proves a web finding, before attaching it as evidence. It converts raw request/response text into a bounded, redacted evidence pack and a stable request_ref/response_ref hash.
Why go through it instead of pasting the raw exchange into the finding:
- It strips secret-bearing headers (
Authorization,Cookie,Set-Cookie,X-Api-Key, CSRF tokens, ...) and inline secrets (AWS keys, GitHub/Slack tokens, JWTs, private keys,user:pass@in URLs). Raw secrets must never land in a finding, artifact, report, or prompt (PRD section 9/11). - It bounds the body: full bodies are hashed and previewed (first 512 bytes), never stored whole.
- The
request_refis a stable hash of the exchange, so the same request always maps to the same id -- use it to cross-reference and dedup evidence across findings.
Workflow: capture the request (and response) text -> call http_audit({ request, response }) -> attach the returned request_ref/response_ref and the redacted pack to the finding via mantis_findings finding_update evidence. The tool makes NO network call itself; you pass in traffic you already captured under authorized, scoped testing.
Do not defeat the redaction by separately pasting the raw header/body you just redacted into the finding or report. If you need to prove a specific secret was exposed, reference it by its redaction label and location, and follow the secrets-scan skill's remediation guidance (rotate/revoke, then remove from source and history).
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 17 lines · 43 tokens per session scan A 2f7c9fbab19b
http-evidence is a skill published in the GitHub repository deonmenezes/mantishack (504 stars, last pushed 18d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 43 tokens to every session and 417 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
graph-db-writes
Writing to the Neo4j attack-surface graph in RedAmon: the tenant-isolation MERGE key every entity node must carry, where graph methods live (mixins, not the client), and the schema places that must be updated together. A MERGE missing the tenant key silently merges one project's data into another's. Trigger: editing…
project-settings-cascade
Changing or adding a project setting / default value in RedAmon. A single setting is duplicated across Prisma, two separate Python settings modules, the orchestrator defaults endpoint, and the frontend fallback; miss a layer and the UI shows one value while the backend uses another, and existing projects keep the old…
recon-ai-enrichment
Wiring an LLM into a recon tool's decisions ("let AI pick {feature} for {tool}"): the never-raise contract, the per-target cache, the full+partial coverage, and the two UI toggles bound to one field. A raising AI helper or an empty fallback silently breaks or disables a live scan. Trigger: adding or editing a recon AI…
plugin-platform
The plugin platform, always on: third-party plugin code runs isolated in the plugin runner, reaches RedAmon only through the Gateway, and changes agent behaviour only through text a person approved in core UI. The base repository holds no plugin logic, and a host that cannot run the platform is refused, never…
builtin-agent-skill
Adding a built-in Agent Skill (an attack technique like ssrf, xxe, rce) that ships hardcoded in RedAmon: classified by the Intent Router, injected into the agent prompt, toggled per project, badged in the chat drawer. Ten layers across agentic and webapp, two of which fail with no error. Trigger: adding or editing a…
orchestrator-container-spawn
Spawning and hardening scan containers from the recon orchestrator: the security flags that look correct and break the container, and the sibling bind-mount path handling. capdrop and no-new-privileges were each reverted after breaking real scans. Trigger: editing reconorchestrator/containermanager.py; changing how a…