Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add DouglasRao/Claude-Pentest-Skills --skill ad-postexploitationgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/DouglasRao/Claude-Pentest-SkillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/douglasrao/claude-pentest-skills/ad-postexploitation)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/douglasrao/claude-pentest-skills/ad-postexploitation"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/douglasrao/claude-pentest-skills/ad-postexploitation/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/douglasrao/claude-pentest-skills/ad-postexploitation"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/douglasrao/claude-pentest-skills/ad-postexploitation.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00137 | $0.05324 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00068 | $0.02662 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00027 | $0.01065 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00014 | $0.00532 |
Grade C, and why
ad-postexploitation scanned grade C with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Harvests environment variableshighData exfiltration
Enumerating or grepping the environment for keys collects credentials unrelated to what the mod says it does.
escalate to Domain Admin, harvest credentials from memory or disk, establish domain persistence, How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 573 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
AD Post-Exploitation — Lateral Movement, Escalation & Persistence
Architecture
This skill is largely knowledge-driven. Most commands run on Windows targets via an established shell (evil-winrm, psexec, WMI, RDP). The attack machine (Linux/macOS) handles tooling orchestration with impacket and tunneling utilities.
Context required:
SHELL_TYPE = evil-winrm / psexec / wmiexec / RDP / meterpreter
TARGET_IP = IP of the compromised host
DC_IP = Domain Controller IP
DOMAIN = domain FQDN
USERNAME = compromised account
PASSWORD / NTLM_HASH = credentials
PRIVILEGE = current privilege level (standard user / local admin / DA)
Initial Setup — Situational Awareness
Run immediately after gaining access:
# Identity
whoami /all
# Domain context
net user %username% /domain
net group "Domain Admins" /domain
net group "Enterprise Admins" /domain
# Network
ipconfig /all
route print
netstat -ano | findstr ESTABLISHED
# AV / EDR
sc query windefend
tasklist | findstr -i "defender\|carbon\|crowdstrike\|sentinel\|cylance\|cbdefense"
# PowerShell execution policy
Get-ExecutionPolicy -List
Create progress tasks with TaskCreate:
"STAGE 1 — Situational Awareness (identity, network, AV)"
"STAGE 2 — Credential Harvesting (LSASS, SAM, LSA secrets)"
"STAGE 3 — Lateral Movement (PTH, PTT, WinRM, PSExec)"
"STAGE 4 — Domain Privilege Escalation"
"STAGE 5 — Domain Persistence"
"STAGE 6 — Data Exfiltration"
"STAGE 7 — Cleanup Checklist"
Evidence Capture — Required at Every Stage
Before every major action, capture a screenshot:
# macOS (attack machine — terminal screenshot)
screencapture -x "$OUT/evidence/stage_$(date +%H%M%S)_$DESCRIPTION.png"
# Linux
scrot "$OUT/evidence/stage_$(date +%H%M%S)_$DESCRIPTION.png"
# BloodHound attack path export
# In BloodHound GUI: right-click path → Export → save as $OUT/evidence/bloodhound_path_to_DA.png
Capture terminal output to file alongside every command:
# Example: wrap evil-winrm session output
script -q -c "evil-winrm -i $TARGET_IP -u $USERNAME -p $PASSWORD" \
"$OUT/evidence/shell_${TARGET_IP}_$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M%S).log"
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 11d ago First seen · 573 lines · 137 tokens per session scan C 8a93ceb22f12
ad-postexploitation is a skill published in the GitHub repository DouglasRao/Claude-Pentest-Skills (11 stars, last pushed 5mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 137 tokens to every session and 5,324 once invoked, about $0.0007 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it C with 1 finding (harvests environment variables). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
abusing-dpapi-for-credential-access
Extract and decrypt Windows DPAPI-protected secrets (Credential Manager, browser logins/cookies, Wi-Fi credentials, KeePass keys) online or offline using SharpDPAPI, SharpChrome, Mimikatz, or Impacket's dpapi.py, including domain-wide decryption via the DPAPI backup key. Use during authorized red-team…
conducting-domain-persistence-with-dcsync
Perform DCSync attacks to replicate Active Directory credentials and establish domain persistence by extracting KRBTGT, Domain Admin, and service account hashes for Golden Ticket creation.
conducting-internal-network-penetration-test
Execute an internal network penetration test simulating an insider threat or post-breach attacker to identify lateral movement paths, privilege escalation vectors, and sensitive data exposure within the corporate network.
conducting-internal-reconnaissance-with-bloodhound-ce
Conduct internal Active Directory reconnaissance using BloodHound Community Edition to map attack paths, identify privilege escalation chains, and discover misconfigurations in domain environments.
analyzing-active-directory-acl-abuse
Detect dangerous ACL misconfigurations in Active Directory using ldap3 to identify GenericAll, WriteDACL, and WriteOwner abuse paths.
abusing-dpapi-for-credential-access
Extract and decrypt Windows DPAPI-protected secrets (Credential Manager, browser logins/cookies, Wi-Fi credentials, KeePass keys) online or offline using SharpDPAPI, SharpChrome, Mimikatz, or Impacket's dpapi.py, including domain-wide decryption via the DPAPI backup key. Use during authorized red-team…