Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add DouglasRao/Claude-Pentest-Skills --skill ad-reportgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/DouglasRao/Claude-Pentest-SkillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/douglasrao/claude-pentest-skills/ad-report)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/douglasrao/claude-pentest-skills/ad-report"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/douglasrao/claude-pentest-skills/ad-report/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/douglasrao/claude-pentest-skills/ad-report"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/douglasrao/claude-pentest-skills/ad-report.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00099 | $0.04388 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00049 | $0.02194 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00020 | $0.00878 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00439 |
Grade A, and why
ad-report scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
Copies of this mod
1 near-identical copy found in the catalogue:
- web-report — 88% identical, 417 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 442 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
AD Report — Technical & Executive Report Generation
Architecture
This skill is Claude-driven. It reads output directories from prior AD skills, organizes all confirmed findings, writes the full report in the correct format, reviews it twice, and publishes to Notion.
Input directories (any combination):
$RECON_OUT — ad-recon output (users.txt, nmap_dc.txt, enum4linux, bloodhound zips, asrep/kerberoast hashes)
$EXPLOIT_OUT — ad-exploitation output (cracked hashes, admin_hosts.txt, dcsync_hashes.txt)
$POSTEX_OUT — ad-postexploitation output (lsass dumps, lateral movement evidence, persistence)
$EVIDENCE_DIR — screenshots directory (BloodHound paths, hashcat output, CME Pwn3d results)
Initial Setup
TARGET_DOMAIN="corp.local"
DC_IP="10.10.10.100"
CLIENT="Client Company Name"
ENGAGEMENT="Active Directory Penetration Test"
TESTER="[Your Name / Company]"
DATE="$(date +%Y-%m-%d)"
RECON_OUT="$(pwd)/corp-local"
EXPLOIT_OUT="$(pwd)/corp-local-exploit"
POSTEX_OUT="$(pwd)/corp-local-postex" # leave empty if not applicable
EVIDENCE_DIR="$(pwd)/corp-local/evidence"
# Report mode — default: combined (recommended)
REPORT_MODE="combined" # options: combined | technical | executive
Create progress tasks with TaskCreate:
"PHASE 1 — Finding Triage & Consolidation"
"PHASE 2 — Evidence Collection & Organization"
"PHASE 3 — Report Writing"
"PHASE 4 — Review #1 (completeness and technical accuracy)"
"PHASE 5 — Review #2 (clarity, language, formatting)"
"PHASE 6 — Notion Publication"
Report Modes
| Mode | Target audience | What it includes |
|---|---|---|
combined (default) |
Mixed — technical and management | Full technical detail + executive sections with plain-language explanations. Recommended when audience is unknown. |
technical |
Security team, sysadmins, blue team | Full technical detail, attack commands, Kerberos internals, BloodHound path details |
executive |
C-level, board, CISO | Business impact, risk ratings, remediation priorities — no raw attack commands |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 12d ago First seen · 442 lines · 99 tokens per session scan A 8708e48b3d9c
ad-report is a skill published in the GitHub repository DouglasRao/Claude-Pentest-Skills (11 stars, last pushed 5mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 99 tokens to every session and 4,388 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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