Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add dslsdzc/rev-skills --skill re-evasiongit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/dslsdzc/rev-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-evasion)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-evasion"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-evasion/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-evasion"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-evasion.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector pass
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00059 | $0.03354 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00030 | $0.01677 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00012 | $0.00671 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00335 |
Grade A, and why
re-evasion scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 115 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
检测规避与 EDR 对抗分析
何时使用 / 何时不用
- 用：恶意样本/工具被检测（杀软、EDR）后分析其规避手段——AMSI 绕过、ETW 禁用、无文件执行、lolbin 链
- 用：回答"为什么被检测"与"绕过点在哪"（与检测侧对齐，步骤 5）
- 用：无文件/内存载荷的执行链分析（载荷不落盘的样本）
- 不用：纯静态代码分析（那是 [[re-binary-core]]）；不关心绕过机制、只观察行为的动态分析（那是 [[re-behavior]]）
- 不用：检测规则编写本身（那是 [[re-ioc]] 的 YARA 与检测工程侧）
- 注意：本技能以 Windows 为主（AMSI/ETW/lolbin 均为 Windows 概念）；Linux/macOS 的类似对抗（ptrace 检测、Dyld 注入、kext 绕过）按同一"规避识别→绕过点定位"框架套用
工具准备
规避分析必须动态执行 + 内存取证：全程在沙箱内（[[re-sandbox]] 强制前置，[[platform-tips]] 最高原则）。所有工具先验证再使用。
amsi.dll 内存对照 —— AMSI patch 定位主力（无独立安装包）
- 原理: 磁盘
C:\Windows\System32\amsi.dll与内存中的 amsi.dll 逐字节对照，函数头差异即 patch 点 - 取内存拷贝: Sysinternals procdump（微软官网/
winget install Microsoft.Sysinternals.Procdump）procdump -accepteula -ma <pid> mem.dmp；或 [[re-memdump]]（gcore/WSL）全量转储 - 验证: 对未运行样本的场景用 AMSITrigger 兜底；对照脚本见步骤 2
AMSITrigger —— 定位触发 AMSI 扫描的字符串（Outflank 出品）
- 下载: GitHub 检索
AMSITrigger（原 outflanknl 仓库已不可用，社区镜像常见，如 RythmStick/AMSITrigger）；.NET 工具，解压即用 - 验证:
AMSITrigger.exe -i test.ps1输出逐行触发状态（Detected / Not Detected） - 用途: 分析"脚本里哪些字符串触发检测"→ 对应混淆/规避目标
ETW 监控 —— logman / SilkETW / WPR / ETWConsumer 类工具
- logman（Windows 内置）: 验证
logman query providers | findstr /i sysmon；logman query -ets看活动会话 - SilkETW（Mandiant 开源，C#）: GitHub releases 下载；验证:
SilkETW.exe -t user -pn Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon -ot file -p out.etl能生成 .etl - WPR（Windows Performance Recorder，内置）:
wpr -start后wpr -stop out.etl - ETWConsumer 等第三方 ETW 消费者工具（GitHub 检索，按需）；本机看 provider 的替代:
tracerpt解析 .etl - 用途: 确认 ETW 是否被禁——事件流中断/缺失即禁用证据（见步骤 3）
Sysmon / procmon —— 进程链与执行行为（lolbin 链追踪）
- Sysmon（Sysinternals，微软官方）: 配置含 ProcessCreate（事件 1，记录父子进程与命令行）；验证:
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational';Id=1} | select -First 1 - procmon（Sysinternals）: 文件/注册表/进程/网络全量，可按进程树过滤；验证:
procmon.exe /AcceptEula /Quiet能启动 - 二者均无发行版包，从微软官网/Sysinternals 下载
操作步骤
按顺序执行，每步产物（内存转储/ETL/日志/命令行走访记录）存档 sha256 + 路径（[[re-ioc]] 证据链要求）。
- 规避手段识别（先分类再深入）：
- 输入: 样本/工具 + 检测触发信息（杀软告警、EDR 日志、沙箱告警）
- 分类清单（按特征归档）: AMSI 绕过（patch / 反射加载）、ETW 禁用（patch provider / 掩码）、无文件（内存执行 / 注册表运行键 + 远程脚本 / WMI）、lolbin 链（rundll32 / mshta / regsvr32 / WMI / PowerShell）、字符串编码混淆（防特征）
- 证据采集: 沙箱内运行（[[re-sandbox]]）→ Sysmon/procmon 记录进程创建链与命令行；同时 [[re-memdump]] 留内存快照（默认转储优先，[[platform-tips]]「直读 vs 转储」）；PowerShell 开启 ScriptBlock 日志（事件 4104）与模块日志
- 先跑一遍不 patch 的基准样本确认"检测触发点"（见坑 5 与步骤 5 对齐）
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 11d ago First seen · 115 lines · 59 tokens per session scan A e8dc91cbef43
re-evasion is a skill published in the GitHub repository dslsdzc/rev-skills (52 stars, last pushed 12d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 59 tokens to every session and 3,354 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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