Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add dslsdzc/rev-skills --skill re-forensicsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/dslsdzc/rev-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-forensics)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-forensics"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-forensics/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-forensics"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-forensics.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector pass
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00117 | $0.01478 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00059 | $0.00739 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00023 | $0.00296 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00012 | $0.00148 |
Grade A, and why
re-forensics scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 56 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
内存取证与威胁情报
完整工作流
- 转储来源：默认转储优先——先确认有没有现成 dump；没有则按 [[re-memdump]] 转一份（
gcore -o out <pid>，脱壳样本须等 OEP 解密后，转储前按/proc/<pid>/maps过滤[vsyscall]/[vdso]，见 [[platform-tips]]「直读 vs 转储」决策表与 Linux 内存转储极端段）；已有 .raw/.mem/.core 直接进入下一步 - 内存取证：[[re-mem-forensics]] —— 确认 dump 来源与架构 → 进程列表（pslist）→ 网络连接（netscan）→ 注入/异常（dlllist/malfind）→ 凭据线索（hashdump/lsadump）与可疑对象提取
- 线索提取：从内存取证产物里整理线索——可疑进程/注入地址/网络回连/凭据哈希/提取出的对象（模块、shellcode、明文密钥），每项记证据路径与时间戳（取证要求可追溯，见 [[platform-tips]]）
- 情报关联：[[re-ti]] —— 用线索中的哈希/域名/IP 查 VirusTotal / Any.run / hybrid-analysis，家族与团伙关联，结果进 [[re-ioc]] 的 IOC 列表与报告
每步产物（dump、插件输出、提取对象）按 sha256 + 路径存档，供报告与 [[re-ioc]] 引用。
何时用哪个原子技能（选择树）
按输入特征/目标分支：
- 已有 dump 或进程已死（有 .raw/.mem/.core） → [[re-mem-forensics]]（进程/网络/注入/凭据线索）
- 没有 dump 需要现场取 → 先 [[re-memdump]]（默认转储优先）→ 回 [[re-mem-forensics]]
- 要查样本背景（"这个 hash/域名/IP 是什么""哪个家族"） → [[re-ti]]（VT/Any.run/hybrid-analysis/MISP）
- 磁盘/文件系统取证（删除恢复、时间线、可疑文件定位） → [[re-disk-forensics]]（磁盘侧取证，与 [[re-mem-forensics]] 内存侧并列）
- 内存分析找到可疑对象/回连后需要深挖 → 可疑模块/shellcode 转 [[re-binary-core]]（[[re-ghidra]] / [[re-ida]] 静态）；回连行为验证转 [[re-malware]]（沙箱）
- 只做文件静态分析，不涉及内存 → 不是本网关，转 [[re-binary-core]] / [[re-malware]]
- 容器镜像（docker save/skopeo 导出的镜像 tar） → 下方「容器镜像取证」章节
容器镜像取证
- 镜像结构：tar 归档 + 分层（每层 = 文件系统快照差异；
docker save/skopeo copy导出） - 层提取：解包层归档 → 逐层文件系统分析（复用 [[re-disk-forensics]] / [[re-fw-rootfs]] 的方法：文件枚举、删除文件恢复）
- 分析重点：配置与密钥（环境变量、挂载点、entrypoint/CMD 脚本）、历史层残留（删除的文件在旧层仍可恢复）、恶意镜像判定（启动命令、网络行为、可疑二进制）
- 输出：镜像内容清单 + 可疑项列表（与 [[re-ioc]] 的指标提取衔接）
跨域联合
- 本网关被 [[re-malware]] 深度分析路径引用——行为分析后需查内存残留（注入、内存中的载荷、凭据）时转 [[re-forensics]]；情报关联结果回传 [[re-malware]] 佐证家族判定
- 磁盘侧取证 [[re-disk-forensics]] 与内存侧 [[re-mem-forensics]] 并列——磁盘证据（删除文件/时间线）与内存证据（进程/网络/凭据）互相佐证
- 转储产物来自 [[re-memdump]]（默认转储优先，见 [[platform-tips]]）
- 情报衔接 [[re-ioc]]——[[re-ti]] 的查询结果与 [[re-mem-forensics]] 的线索汇总成 IOC 列表与报告
- 可疑对象（提取的模块/shellcode）深挖 → [[re-binary-core]]（[[re-ghidra]] / [[re-ida]] 反编译）
- 本网关被 [[re-analyze]] 的 triage「内存取证 / 情报查询」路径调用
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 56 lines · 117 tokens per session scan A 3e61d5f11228
re-forensics is a skill published in the GitHub repository dslsdzc/rev-skills (50 stars, last pushed 10d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 117 tokens to every session and 1,478 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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