Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add dslsdzc/rev-skills --skill re-keygengit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/dslsdzc/rev-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-keygen)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-keygen"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-keygen/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-keygen"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-keygen.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector pass
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00028 | $0.03365 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00014 | $0.01682 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00006 | $0.00673 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00336 |
Grade A, and why
re-keygen scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 120 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
注册机算法还原（keygen）
何时使用 / 何时不用
- 边界（继承 [[re-cracking]]）：仅限自有软件 / 授权测试 / CTF·研究环境；禁止未授权软件解锁与商业软件绕过；注册机产物不得扩散分发
- 用：已从 [[re-license]] 拿到校验算法，且算法可逆（比较 / 变换 / 查表可逆向成生成步骤）
- 用：需要为任意输入（用户名 / 机器码）生成合法序列号（分发、测试、验证场景）
- 用：不修改目标文件的分发方案（比 [[re-patching]] 干净，不触发自校验 / 签名问题）
- 不用：校验点 / 校验算法都还没定位（先 [[re-license]]）
- 不用：算法含不可逆部分（哈希 / 非对称验签）——正推生成不可能，改走 [[re-patching]]（见坑 1）
- 不用：序列号是服务器生成后下发的随机值（生成逻辑在服务器端，本地只有校验）
- 不用：程序对序列号还有服务器侧二次验证（生成逻辑再可逆也无用，先确认全校验点清单）
- 注意：生成的序列号必须在沙箱内验证（[[re-sandbox]]，[[platform-tips]] 最高原则）；与合法序列号对照验证（见坑 4）
工具准备
反编译产物（算法还原的原料）
- [[re-ghidra]] / [[re-ida]] / [[re-radare2]] 对校验函数的反编译伪代码（来自 [[re-license]] 步骤 3）；导出函数级伪代码与比较链（
pdf @ sym.check_license等），作为逐行翻译的对照（见坑 4） - 验证: 反编译视图能完整展示校验函数的比较 / 变换语句
python3（注册机实现）
- Linux:
apt install python3（多数自带）；macOS:brew install python；Windows:choco install python/ 官方安装包 - 验证:
python3 --version - python 标准库足够（argparse/struct/hashlib/re）；位宽运算注意掩码（
& 0xFFFFFFFF模拟 32 位无符号溢出）
z3-solver（可选，约束求解）
pip install z3-solver- 验证:
python3 -c "import z3; print(z3.get_version_string())" - 适用：校验是"比较链 / 数学关系"（如序列号满足多个等式），直接逆推繁琐时建模求解（建模思路见 [[re-z3]]）
- 注意：z3 只对可逆部分建模；纯哈希 / 签名部分无解（见坑 1）
调试器（可选，中间值对照）
- [[re-x64dbg]]（Windows）/ [[re-gdb]]（Linux / Wine）/ [[re-lldb]]（macOS）——断在比较指令处看程序内部中间值，与脚本中间值逐一对照（坑 4 的方法）
操作步骤
按顺序执行，每步记录结果（算法伪代码 / 生成脚本 / 验证结果，证据路径见 [[re-triage]]）。输入输出清单先行：输入（用户名 / 机器码 / 固定常量）、输出（序列号格式）、比对方式（逐位相等 / 校验位）。
-
从 [[re-license]] 拿到的校验算法：
- 取校验点清单中的算法伪代码：输入来源（读注册表 / 用户输入 / 机器码）、变换步骤（每次算术 / XOR / 查表）、最终比对方式（strcmp / 校验位 / 签名验证）
- 列出"合法序列号必须满足"的每条约束（格式长度、字符集、校验位、与输入的关系），写进算法文档
-
序列号格式分析（先于算法）：
- 长度 / 字符集（数字 / 大写 / 混合）/ 分隔符（
XXXX-XXXX-XXXX）/ 大小写敏感 / 校验位位置（尾部 / 固定位） - 例：
ABCD-1234-EFGH-5678可能是 4 组 × 4 字符 + 校验组——格式约束决定生成器的输出框架，先按格式生成候选再填算法结果，比算法做完再套格式少出错 - 格式与算法耦合：分隔符是否参与校验（常见两类：只比数字 / 全串比对）要确认，参与与否改变生成器的分段逻辑
- 长度 / 字符集（数字 / 大写 / 混合）/ 分隔符（
-
算法分类与可逆判定：
- 等值比较型（
serial == f(name)）：直接serial = f(name)——比较方向反转即可 - 变换型（算术 / XOR / 移位）：XOR 对称直接逆；模运算用模逆（
pow(a, -1, m)，需 gcd(a,m)=1）；LCG 逆推（state = a^{-1}(state' - c) mod m） - 查表型：把映射表求逆（输入→输出 变成 输出→输入）；表非双射时列全部候选
- 校验位型（Luhn / CRC16/32 / mod 97 / mod 11）：先算数据位再补校验位；CRC 是 GF(2) 线性运算，可反解出"使 CRC 等于目标值"的后缀字节
- 加解密型（XOR / base64 / 自定义对称变换）：解密器逆用即生成器（[[re-crypto-id]] / [[re-crypto-decrypt]] 思路）
- 单向型（哈希 / RSA / ECC 验签）：不可逆——该部分如实报告，转 [[re-patching]]（见坑 1）
- 每类结论写进算法文档：类型判定 + 逆推依据（哪一步可逆、哪一步不可逆）
- 混合型常见：变换 + 校验位叠加（数据位过变换、整体加校验）——按"变换层 → 校验层"分层逆推，每层单独验证
- 等值比较型（
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 120 lines · 28 tokens per session scan A 39a71db79ec0
re-keygen is a skill published in the GitHub repository dslsdzc/rev-skills (54 stars, last pushed 14d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 28 tokens to every session and 3,365 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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