Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add dslsdzc/rev-skills --skill re-memdumpgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/dslsdzc/rev-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-memdump)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-memdump"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-memdump/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-memdump"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-memdump.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector pass
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00048 | $0.02853 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00024 | $0.01426 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00010 | $0.00571 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00285 |
Grade A, and why
re-memdump scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 139 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
内存转储与提取
何时使用 / 何时不用
- 用：任何需要读进程内存的任务（找密钥/解密数据、脱壳后提取干净样本、DEX 提取）；进程已死后的 core 分析；attach 被禁时的兜底
- 不用：实时交互调试（那是 [[re-gdb]] / [[re-lldb]] / [[re-x64dbg]] 的活）
- 不用：静态可得的字符串/结构（静态优先）
工具准备
参考 [[platform-tips]]「直读 vs 转储」决策表与 Linux 内存转储极端段——默认转储优先，直读仅特例。
gdb / gcore（转储主力）
- Linux:
apt install gdb/dnf install gdb/pacman -S gdb（gcore 随附） - WSL: Linux 包
- 验证:
gcore --help/gdb --version
gdb core 分析工具
- gdb（
gdb ./target core）、elfutilseu-stack（apt install elfutils）、file core - 验证:
eu-stack --version
volatility（内存取证分析）
- 全平台:
pip install volatility3（命令vol）；volatility2 旧版 Python2 按需 - 验证:
vol -h；vol -f core windows.info能识别镜像
proc / psmisc（进程状态）
- Linux:
apt install procps psmisc/dnf install procps-ng psmisc/pacman -S procps-ng psmisc（多数自带） - 验证:
ps aux、pkill可用
Windows 转储（procdump / DumpIt，补充分支）
- procdump（Sysinternals 官方下载，或
choco install sysinternals）：procdump -accepteula -ma <pid> out.dmp全进程内存转储（含托管堆）——x64dbg/windbg 可加载分析 - DumpIt（Comae 官网）：整机物理内存转储（.raw），管理员运行——供 [[re-mem-forensics]] 整机取证
- 验证:
procdump -accepteula -?输出 usage；转储产物用file确认（dmp/raw 头）
操作步骤
-
默认转储：等 OEP 解密后
gcore -o out <pid>：gcore -o out <pid> # 或调试器内 gdb -q -p <pid> -ex 'gcore out' -ex detach -ex quit- 转储含完整内存 + 寄存器/线程状态（ELF notes），可直接导入 [[re-ghidra]] / [[re-ida]]
- 时机：脱壳样本必须在进程运行到 OEP（壳解密完成）后再 dump，否则拿到的是壳的初始状态（见坑 2）
- 一次转储满足后续所有定向提取需求——不重复多次 dump
-
转储前按 maps 过滤 vsyscall/vdso：
cat /proc/<pid>/maps > maps.txt grep -E 'vsyscall|vdso|vvar' maps.txt # 这些段必须剔除 # 只保留 r--p / rw-p 可读映射区域作为提取范围按 [[platform-tips]] Linux 内存转储极端段:
[vsyscall]（0xffffffffff600000）、[vdso]/[vvar]读取失败正常，dump 进 core 也只是垃圾页——转储后提取时跳过，或用 maps 白名单方式直读（步骤 5）。 -
导入 Ghidra/IDA 分析（core 复盘）：
gdb -q ./target out # core 复盘: bt / info registers / x/gx $rsp eu-stack -e out | head -30 # 快速栈回溯Ghidra:
File > Import File选 core（Ghidra 支持 ELF core 导入），符号/堆栈线索可用。- gcore 产物是单进程 ELF core，不是整机物理内存镜像——Volatility 的
linux.pslist等插件只适用于整机镜像（采集方式如 LiME/dd if=/dev/mem），gcore 上按 [[re-mem-forensics]] 流程跑会失败；进程级枚举用 gdb/eu-stack/ELF core 解析与定向提取即可
- gcore 产物是单进程 ELF core，不是整机物理内存镜像——Volatility 的
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 139 lines · 48 tokens per session scan A 1e02abe4bb7f
re-memdump is a skill published in the GitHub repository dslsdzc/rev-skills (54 stars, last pushed 14d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 48 tokens to every session and 2,853 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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