Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add dslsdzc/rev-skills --skill re-proto-revgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/dslsdzc/rev-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-proto-rev)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-proto-rev"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-proto-rev/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-proto-rev"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-proto-rev.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector pass
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00038 | $0.04412 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00019 | $0.02206 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00008 | $0.00882 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00441 |
Grade A, and why
re-proto-rev scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 140 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
协议状态机重建
何时使用 / 何时不用
- 用：手上有明文流量（pcap 或实时流）需要搞清"消息长什么样、双方怎么对话"
- 用：自定义协议 / 私有协议 / 未知协议的字段结构推断
- 用：C2 协议、固件通信协议的交互模式推演（握手/心跳/结束）
- 不用：流量是密文（先 [[re-crypto-id]] → [[re-crypto-keys]] → [[re-crypto-decrypt]]，解出明文再回来）
- 不用：标准协议（HTTP/TLS/DNS）——直接 Wireshark 解码器（见 [[re-netcap]] 步骤 3）
- 不用：只需要抓流量（那是 [[re-netcap]]）
工具准备
所有工具先验证再使用。本技能只处理数据与解析脚本，不运行样本，可免沙箱（[[platform-tips]] 最高原则）；抓流量环节在 [[re-netcap]] 内进行。
python3 —— 解析脚本运行环境
- Linux:
apt install python3 python3-pip/dnf install python3 python3-pip/pacman -S python python-pip（多数自带） - macOS:
brew install python（或 Xcode CLT 自带） - Windows: python.org 安装包（勾选 Add to PATH）；WSL 内 Linux 版
- 验证:
python3 --version
scapy —— pcap 解析与协议构造主力
- 全平台:
pip install scapy（Python 3，推荐） - Linux: 部分发行版有包（
apt install python3-scapy） - 验证:
python3 -c "import scapy; print(scapy.__version__)" - 读 pcap 文件:
rdpcap即可，纯 Python 解析（无需 libpcap；libpcap 仅实时抓包sniff()时需要，强制纯 Python 解析用conf.use_pcap = False） - 验证（跨平台，写临时 pcap 再读回，不依赖 /dev/null）:
python3 -c "import tempfile,os; from scapy.all import rdpcap, wrpcap, IP, TCP, Raw; f=os.path.join(tempfile.gettempdir(),'t.pcap'); wrpcap(f,[IP()/TCP()/Raw(b'test')]); print(len(rdpcap(f)))"—— 输出1即正常
tshark —— 分组统计与字段初探（安装见 [[re-netcap]]）
tshark -r out.pcap -q -z conv,tcp会话统计、-z io,stat,1时间序列——步骤 1 聚类用- 验证:
tshark --version
binwalk —— 已知格式线索（pcap 里嵌 blob 时找格式）
- 安装与验证见 [[re-fw-extract]] 工具准备
- 用途: 解析出的字段里疑似嵌了文件/镜像（gzip/zip/PNG 等）时，用
binwalk blob.bin确认格式
操作步骤
按顺序执行，每步记下结果。前提：流量必须是明文（密文先走 [[re-crypto-decrypt]]）。
- 分组统计与聚类（长度/方向/时序）：
tshark -r out.pcap -T fields -e tcp.len -e ip.src -e ip.dst | awk '{print $1}' | sort -n | uniq -c # 长度分布 tshark -r out.pcap -q -z conv,tcp # 会话列表：谁和谁、包数、字节数 tshark -r out.pcap -q -z io,stat,1 # 每秒流量：找规律性心跳- 聚类目标：按方向（A→B / B→A）分组看长度分布；长度呈少量固定值 → 固定长度消息（可能无长度字段）；长度连续变化 → 变长消息（通常需要某种 framing，候选：内嵌长度字段、分隔符、固定语法、chunk 分块、连接关闭）
- 找规律性间隔包（每 30s 一个固定长度小包）→ 心跳消息（见坑 3）
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 140 lines · 38 tokens per session scan A c5187427e6d4
re-proto-rev is a skill published in the GitHub repository dslsdzc/rev-skills (54 stars, last pushed 14d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 38 tokens to every session and 4,412 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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