Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add dslsdzc/rev-skills --skill re-unpack-advancedgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/dslsdzc/rev-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-unpack-advanced)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-unpack-advanced"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-unpack-advanced/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-unpack-advanced"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-unpack-advanced.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector pass
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00044 | $0.05620 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00022 | $0.02810 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00009 | $0.01124 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00562 |
Grade A, and why
re-unpack-advanced scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 104 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
脱壳：强壳（VMProtect/Themida）
何时使用 / 何时不用
- 用：[[re-packer-id]] 识别为强壳 / 虚拟化壳（VMProtect、Themida、Enigma 等）；简单壳手动流程失败（可能套强壳）；样本存在多层反调试拦截普通调试
- 用：需要干净样本做深度静态分析 / 破解前置（[[re-cracking]] 路径）
- 不用：简单压缩壳（[[re-unpack-simple]] 秒解，别用重流程）
- 不用：虚拟化代码可接受黑盒标注的目标（标记绕过比还原省 10 倍时间，见坑 2）
- 注意：本技能高成本、易失败——先评估目标价值与"只标注不还原"是否够用
工具准备
调试器（按 OS）
- Linux / Wine 下调试 PE: [[re-gdb]] ——
apt install gdb/dnf install gdb/pacman -S gdb；Wine 直读：wine sample.exe后gdb -p <pid>attach（见 [[platform-tips]] Linux 分支） - Windows: [[re-x64dbg]] —— 官方 release zip；x64dbg 对强壳的附加/断点支持更好，强壳场景优先
- WSL: 无法 attach Windows 进程，走 Windows 侧工具（[[platform-tips]] WSL 分支）
- 验证:
gdb --version；x64dbg 能载入样本并单步
Scylla（IAT 修复，含重定向处理）
- x64dbg 新版内置；独立版 GitHub
NtQuery/Scyllarelease - Wine 环境：独立版 Scylla 可 attach Wine 进程（失败则在 Windows 环境完成）
- 验证: x64dbg 插件菜单出现 Scylla
scyllaHide（反反调试，GitHub）
- GitHub
x64dbg/ScyllaHiderelease zip；x64dbg 插件目录放入后启用；release 内含 Wine 加载方案 - 作用：批量隐藏调试痕迹（NtQueryInformationProcess、ThreadHideFromDebugger、时间差、调试端口等）
- 验证: x64dbg 插件菜单出现 ScyllaHide，勾选选项后能隐藏对应检测
脚本工具（脱壳辅助/标注）
- idapython: IDA 自带（[[re-ida]] 工作流），验证：IDA 内
File > Script Command能执行 Python - rizin 脚本:
apt install rizin/dnf install rizin/pacman -S rizin/brew install rizin，验证rizin -v
操作步骤
按顺序执行，每步记录结果（证据路径 + sha256，见 [[re-triage]]）。
-
反调试对抗（scyllaHide 思路）：
- 核心检测点：
NtQueryInformationProcess（ProcessDebugPort / ProcessDebugFlags / ProcessDebugObjectHandle）、NtSetInformationThread（ThreadHideFromDebugger）、时间差（RDTSC/GetTickCount/QueryPerformanceCounter）、调试端口（NtQuerySystemInformation）、窗口 / 进程名枚举。 - x64dbg + ScyllaHide：插件菜单勾选全部选项 → 以隐藏状态启动目标。Wine 下用 release 内 wine 方案加载后再 attach。
- 先攻最外层：检测通常是链式，先静态定位最外层检测点（用 [[re-ida]] / [[re-radare2]] 找
NtQueryInformationProcess的 xref），scyllaHide 批量隐藏 + 剩余单点 patch（见坑 1）。
- 核心检测点：
-
找 OEP（堆栈回溯 / 内存断点组合）：
- 入口 ≠ 原始程序逻辑入口：虚拟化壳仍有"入口"——EP 加载后控制流进入壳代码（Themida 等是进 VM dispatcher），这个入口只是壳的加载/分发点，不是原始程序的逻辑入口。"虚拟化壳无 OEP 概念"的说法不准确——原始入口仍存在，只是被壳藏进 / 绕经 VM 解释层（见坑与陷阱"VM 入口特征随构建变异"），定位它才是本步目标。
- 堆栈回溯：强壳 stub 尾部以
ret回到 OEP——单步 / 断点停在ret，看栈顶地址即 OEP 线索（stub 常多段、多线程，多断几次取规律）。 - 内存断点组合：
bp VirtualAlloc（x64dbg；gdb/Wine 用break *VirtualAlloc）→ 每次返回后检查分配区域是否被写入可执行内容 → 对该区域下内存访问断点（View > Memory Map > 目标节 > Set breakpoint on access）→ 在"最后一次解密写入"后断下，附近即 OEP。 - OEP 特征：函数序言（
push ebp; mov ebp,esp）+ 密集正常 API 引用。记录 OEP 地址与镜像基址。
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 104 lines · 44 tokens per session scan A af8ad2333cf1
re-unpack-advanced is a skill published in the GitHub repository dslsdzc/rev-skills (54 stars, last pushed 14d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 44 tokens to every session and 5,620 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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