Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add dslsdzc/rev-skills --skill re-unpack-simplegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/dslsdzc/rev-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-unpack-simple)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-unpack-simple"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-unpack-simple/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-unpack-simple"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/dslsdzc/rev-skills/re-unpack-simple.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector pass
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00041 | $0.03840 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00020 | $0.01920 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00008 | $0.00768 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00384 |
Grade A, and why
re-unpack-simple scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 105 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
脱壳：压缩壳（UPX/ASPack/FSG）
何时使用 / 何时不用
- 用：[[re-packer-id]] 识别为简单压缩壳（UPX/ASPack/FSG 等）；壳入口有
pushad/pusha特征；需要干净样本继续静态/动态分析 - 用：未知壳手动流程的第一步尝试（ESP 定律对多数压缩壳有效）
- 不用：强壳 / 虚拟化壳（VMProtect/Themida，转 [[re-unpack-advanced]]）
- 不用：目标已确认无壳（直接 [[re-binary-core]]）
- 不用：需要观察带壳行为本身（行为分析有时刻意保留壳，与 [[re-behavior]] 配合时评估）
- 注意：脱壳产物验证必须在沙箱（[[re-sandbox]]，[[platform-tips]] 最高原则）
工具准备
upx（官方解包主力）
- Linux:
apt install upx-ucl/dnf install upx/pacman -S upx - macOS:
brew install upx - Windows: 官方 GitHub release
upx/upx下载 win64 zip（或choco install upx） - WSL: Linux 包
- 验证:
upx --version
调试器（按 OS）
- Linux / Wine 下调试 PE: [[re-gdb]] ——
apt install gdb/dnf install gdb/pacman -S gdb，验证gdb --version。Wine 直读：wine sample.exe运行后gdb -p <pid>attach 直接操作 Wine 进程（见 [[platform-tips]] Linux 分支） - Windows: [[re-x64dbg]] —— 官方 release zip，验证：载入样本能单步
- macOS: PE 脱壳场景走 Wine + [[re-gdb]] 或 Windows VM，不用本机调试器
- WSL: 无法 attach Windows 进程，跨边界走 Windows 侧工具（[[platform-tips]] WSL 分支）
Scylla（Windows IAT 修复）
- x64dbg 新版官方 release 已内置（插件目录 plugins/ 下有 Scylla）
- 独立版: GitHub
NtQuery/Scyllarelease - Wine 环境：独立版 Scylla 可 attach 到 Wine 进程做 dump 修复（失败则在 Windows 环境完成 IAT 修复）
- 验证: x64dbg 插件菜单出现 Scylla，能 Attach 到进程并列出模块
操作步骤
按顺序执行，每步记录结果（证据路径 + sha256，见 [[re-triage]]）；动手前先按 [[re-triage]] 记录脱壳基线五件套（SHA256 / PE timestamp / EP RVA / section hash / import table），脱壳后逐项对照再判定成败。
-
优先官方 / 自动解包（
upx -d）：upx -d sample.exe -o unpacked.exe file unpacked.exe # 应显示正常 PE 结构；仍报 UPX / 报错 → 失败 sha256sum unpacked.exeupx -d失败常见原因：文件被修改过（自校验 / 二次加壳）、UPX 版本不兼容。失败则走步骤 2 手动流程。 -
ESP 定律找 OEP（设断在 pushad 后）：
- 原理：压缩壳入口
pushad保存寄存器 → 壳解密完毕后popad→jmp OEP。对 pushad 之后的 ESP 所指地址下硬件访问断点，运行后在popad后的第一条指令附近找 OEP。 - 本质（技巧，不是脱壳公式）：入口
pushad压栈是壳"保存现场"的必然行为，ESP 定律利用它定位"恢复现场"点——popad恢复后即解密完成、控制流将跳真实代码。它只在"入口压栈保护现场、尾部恢复后跳转"这一实现下成立，并非对一切壳都有效：TLS 回调壳（回调先于 EP 执行，EP 处无压栈现场）、多线程壳（多线程各自压栈、断点命中的栈地址错位）、VMProtect/Themida 等虚拟化壳（入口直接进 VM dispatcher，无 pushad/popad 周期）都不适用。先确认 EP 入口确实是 pushad/popad 周期再用，否则直接走步骤 3 或转 [[re-unpack-advanced]]。 - x64dbg（Windows）：载入 → 停在 EP → 单步见
pushad→ 再单步执行pushad→ 记录 pushad 执行后的 ESP 值 → 右键 ESP 寄存器 → Hardware Breakpoint（on access）→ 运行 → 断在popad后第一条指令 → 下面几行jmp的目标即 OEP。记下 OEP 地址。 - gdb（Linux/Wine，见 [[platform-tips]] Wine 直读）：
(gdb) starti # 停在 EP (gdb) si # 单步执行 pushad（x86 pushad 压 8 个寄存器） (gdb) awatch *(int*)$esp # 对 pushad 后的 ESP 所指地址下硬件观察点（访问即断） (gdb) continue # 运行，popad 访问该地址时触发 - OEP 特征：一段函数序言（
push ebp; mov ebp,esp），其后紧跟大量正常 API 引用。
- 原理：压缩壳入口
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 105 lines · 41 tokens per session scan A ff3ec1f5398a
re-unpack-simple is a skill published in the GitHub repository dslsdzc/rev-skills (54 stars, last pushed 14d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 41 tokens to every session and 3,840 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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