Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to DuqueOM/ML-MLOps-Portfolio. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/DuqueOM/ML-MLOps-Portfolio/main/.devin/skills/secret-breach-response/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/DuqueOM/ML-MLOps-PortfolioWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/duqueom/ml-mlops-portfolio/secret-breach-response)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/duqueom/ml-mlops-portfolio/secret-breach-response"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/duqueom/ml-mlops-portfolio/secret-breach-response/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/duqueom/ml-mlops-portfolio/secret-breach-response"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/duqueom/ml-mlops-portfolio/secret-breach-response.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00027 | $0.01677 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00014 | $0.00839 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00005 | $0.00335 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00168 |
Grade A, and why
secret-breach-response scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 195 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Secret Breach Response
🚨 STOP EVERYTHING FIRST
If you are the agent:
- Halt any running pipeline step (CI deploy, K8s apply, image push)
- Emit:
[AGENT MODE: STOP] Operation: Secret breach response Finding: <secret-type> exposed in <location> Waiting for: Human confirmation to proceed with rotation - Do NOT attempt to rewrite git history or rotate credentials without explicit authorization. Silent rotation destroys the audit trail.
Phase 1 — Detect & Classify (AUTO)
Classify the exposed credential:
| Type | Example pattern | Rotation urgency |
|---|---|---|
| AWS access key | AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16} |
P1 — minutes |
| GCP service account JSON | "private_key": "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- |
P1 — minutes |
| GitHub PAT | ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{36} |
P1 — minutes |
| Database password | (variable) | P2 — 1h |
| Internal API key | (variable) | P2 — 1h |
| Signing key | (variable) | P1 — minutes |
| Slack/webhook URL | hooks.slack.com/services/... |
P3 — 24h |
Determine exposure scope:
- Where was the leak? (git log, CI logs, image layer, Slack message)
- How long has it been exposed? (git commit timestamp, log retention)
- Was it pushed to a public remote? (
git log origin/main) - Did any external CI/CD run with the credential? (check workflow history)
Output classification to incidents/secret-breach-<YYYY-MM-DD-HHMM>.md.
Phase 2 — Revoke Credential (STOP before proceeding)
This phase requires human confirmation. Agent proposes, human executes.
AWS
# Delete the access key at the root of the tree
aws iam delete-access-key --access-key-id <AKIA...> --user-name <username>
# OR disable it first if investigation needed:
aws iam update-access-key --access-key-id <AKIA...> --status Inactive --user-name <username>
GCP
# Delete the service account key
gcloud iam service-accounts keys delete <KEY_ID> \
--iam-account=<service-account-email>
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 12d ago First seen · 195 lines · 27 tokens per session scan A 18842f34ca96
secret-breach-response is a skill published in the GitHub repository DuqueOM/ML-MLOps-Portfolio (5 stars, last pushed 4d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 27 tokens to every session and 1,677 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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