Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/duyet/oma/security-reviewnpx skills add duyet/oma --skill security-reviewgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/duyet/omaWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/duyet/oma/security-review)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/duyet/oma/security-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/duyet/oma/security-review.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00092 | $0.01102 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00046 | $0.00551 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00018 | $0.00220 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00110 |
Grade A, and why
security-review scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Unrestricted tool accesslowExcessive agency
A wildcard tool grant or "run any command" leaves no least-privilege boundary at all.
ability to impersonate another user, ability to run arbitrary code. Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 90 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
security-review
A security review answers: what can an attacker do, and what does it cost them? Vague "this could be more secure" notes don't help anyone triage. For every finding, state the concrete exploit scenario and its impact, ranked by what actually gets exploited in practice.
1. Threat-model the surface first
- Who's the attacker? Anonymous internet user, authenticated user acting against another user's data, or an insider/compromised dependency — the bar for "exploitable" differs for each.
- What's the entry point? Every place untrusted data enters: HTTP request bodies/headers/query params, file uploads, webhook payloads, queue messages, CLI args, env vars from a less-trusted process, LLM tool output.
- What's worth stealing or breaking? Credentials, PII, payment data, ability to impersonate another user, ability to run arbitrary code.
2. Injection — untrusted input reaching a sink
- SQL/NoSQL injection — string-concatenated queries. Fix: parameterized queries / prepared statements, never build a query by interpolating input.
- Command injection — user input reaching a shell (
exec,system, backticks). Fix: avoid the shell entirely (argv arrays, not a shell string); allowlist if you truly need a shell. - Path traversal — user-controlled filenames/paths reaching the
filesystem (
../../etc/passwd). Fix: resolve and verify the path stays under an allowed root; never trust a client-supplied path segment. - SSRF — user-controlled URLs fetched server-side (webhooks, URL preview, "fetch this link"). Fix: allowlist destinations, block internal/link-local IP ranges, disable redirects to internal hosts.
- Template/deserialization injection — user input reaching
eval,pickle.loads, unsafe YAML load, or a template engine's raw-render. Fix: neverevaluntrusted input; use safe (non-executing) deserializers. - XSS — user content rendered as HTML/JS without escaping. Fix: escape by default (framework auto-escaping), never build HTML via string concatenation of user input.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago First seen · 90 lines · 92 tokens per session scan A b4e2d56c9297
security-review is a skill published in the GitHub repository duyet/oma (5 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 92 tokens to every session and 1,102 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (unrestricted tool access). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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