Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/effulgent-point/paw/securitynpx skills add Effulgent-Point/paw --skill securitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Effulgent-Point/pawWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00582 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00291 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00116 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00058 |
Grade A, and why
security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 62 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security Skill
When to use: Any code touching authentication, user input, external APIs, or sensitive data.
OWASP Top 10 cheat sheet
| # | Category | One-line check |
|---|---|---|
| A01 | Broken access control | Is authz checked at the endpoint boundary, not just the UI? |
| A02 | Crypto failures | Any weak algorithms (MD5, SHA1 for passwords)? Plaintext sensitive data? |
| A03 | Injection | Is every query parameterized? Any string interpolation into SQL/commands? |
| A04 | Insecure design | Was there a threat model? Or just hoping for the best? |
| A05 | Misconfiguration | Debug mode off in prod? Default credentials removed? CORS restrictive? |
| A06 | Vulnerable components | Dependencies audited for CVEs? |
| A07 | Auth failures | Session fixation possible? Password policy enforced? |
| A08 | Data integrity | Updates signed? CI inputs trusted? |
| A09 | Logging failures | Security events logged? PII NOT logged? |
| A10 | SSRF | Outbound requests validated? DNS rebinding mitigated? |
Input validation patterns
- Validate at the boundary — first point where external data enters your system
- Check: type, length, format, range, encoding
- Reject early — don't process invalid input hoping it works out
- Prefer allowlists (define what's valid) over denylists (define what's invalid)
Output encoding
Context-dependent — there is no universal "escape":
| Context | Encoding |
|---|---|
| HTML body | HTML entity encode (<, >, &) |
| HTML attribute | Attribute encode + quote the attribute |
| JavaScript | JS string encode, or use JSON.stringify |
| SQL | Parameterized queries (not escaping) |
| URL | URL encode (encodeURIComponent) |
Secret management
- Environment variables or secret manager (Vault, AWS SSM, GCP Secret Manager)
- Never in source code, never in git history
- Rotate immediately on any leak — investigate after
- Different secrets per environment
- Short-lived tokens preferred over long-lived API keys
PII handling
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 3d ago First seen · 62 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A d96b8ce7f24d
security is a skill published in the GitHub repository Effulgent-Point/paw (2 stars, last pushed 23d ago), licensed MIT. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 582 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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