Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add elevanaltd/HestAI-MCP --skill security-threat-modelinggit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/elevanaltd/HestAI-MCPWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/elevanaltd/hestai-mcp/security-threat-modeling)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/elevanaltd/hestai-mcp/security-threat-modeling"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/elevanaltd/hestai-mcp/security-threat-modeling/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/elevanaltd/hestai-mcp/security-threat-modeling"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/elevanaltd/hestai-mcp/security-threat-modeling.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00000 | $0.00778 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00311 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00156 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00078 |
Grade A, and why
security-threat-modeling scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
===SECURITY_THREAT_MODELING=== META: TYPE::SKILL VERSION::"1.0.0" STATUS::ACTIVE PURPOSE::"Security-focused code review lens with OWASP-aligned threat detection"
§1::CORE AUTHORITY::BLOCKING[secrets_exposure⊕injection_vulnerabilities⊕auth_bypass] SCOPE::security_review[OWASP⊕auth_flows⊕dependency_risk⊕injection⊕secrets] MISSION::"Apply security threat modeling to code changes — detect vulnerabilities before they reach production"
§2::PROTOCOL
OWASP_REVIEW_CHECKLIST::[ A01_BROKEN_ACCESS_CONTROL::[missing_authz_checks,IDOR_patterns,privilege_escalation_paths], A02_CRYPTO_FAILURES::[hardcoded_secrets,weak_hashing,plaintext_sensitive_data], A03_INJECTION::[SQL∨NoSQL∨OS_command∨LDAP,unsanitized_user_input,template_injection], A04_INSECURE_DESIGN::[missing_rate_limiting,no_input_validation,trust_boundary_violations], A05_SECURITY_MISCONFIGURATION::[debug_enabled,default_credentials,overly_permissive_CORS] ]
AUTH_FLOW_VALIDATION::[ verify_authentication_before_authorization, check_session_management[expiry⊕rotation⊕invalidation], validate_token_handling[storage⊕transmission⊕scope], flag_missing_CSRF_protection_on_state_changing_endpoints ]
INJECTION_PATTERN_DETECTION::[ string_concatenation_in_queries::BLOCKING, "user_input→eval∨exec∨system_call"::BLOCKING, unsanitized_path_construction[path_traversal]::BLOCKING, "template_rendering_with_raw_user_input"::BLOCKING, parameterized_queries_present::SAFE_SIGNAL ]
SECRETS_EXPOSURE_DETECTION::[ hardcoded_API_keys∨tokens∨passwords::BLOCKING, credentials_in_config_files_without_env_vars::BLOCKING, secrets_in_log_output::BLOCKING, .env_files_committed_to_git::BLOCKING, private_keys_in_source::BLOCKING ]
DEPENDENCY_RISK::[ new_dependency_added::ADVISORY<check_known_vulnerabilities>, pinned_versions::ADVISORY<verify_not_known_vulnerable>, "transitive_dependency_risk::ADVISORY<flag_for_audit>" ]
§3::GOVERNANCE
SEVERITY_CLASSIFICATION::[ BLOCKING::[injection,secrets_exposure,auth_bypass,crypto_failure], ADVISORY::[missing_rate_limiting,overly_broad_permissions,dependency_risk] ]
MUST::[ scan_all_changed_files_for_OWASP_top_5, flag_any_hardcoded_secrets_or_credentials, validate_auth_flows_when_auth_code_changes, check_injection_patterns_in_data_handling_code, assess_new_dependencies_for_known_CVEs ]
NEVER::[ approve_hardcoded_secrets_with_TODO_to_fix_later, ignore_injection_patterns_in_test_code[tests_may_leak_to_prod], downgrade_BLOCKING_security_finding_without_evidence ]
§5::ANCHOR_KERNEL TARGET::security_threat_detection_in_code_reviews NEVER::[approve_hardcoded_secrets,ignore_injection_patterns,skip_auth_flow_validation,downgrade_security_findings_without_evidence] MUST::[scan_OWASP_top_5,detect_secrets_exposure,validate_auth_flows,check_injection_patterns,assess_dependency_risk] GATE::"Does this change introduce security vulnerabilities or weaken existing protections?"
===END===
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 80 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A da3008e586aa
security-threat-modeling is a skill published in the GitHub repository elevanaltd/HestAI-MCP (0 stars, last pushed 11d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 778 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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