Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add ericrisco/rsc-harness --skill google-workspacegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ericrisco/rsc-harnessWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/ericrisco/rsc-harness/google-workspace)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/ericrisco/rsc-harness/google-workspace"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/ericrisco/rsc-harness/google-workspace/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/ericrisco/rsc-harness/google-workspace"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/ericrisco/rsc-harness/google-workspace.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector pass
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00111 | $0.03289 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00056 | $0.01644 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00022 | $0.00658 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00011 | $0.00329 |
Grade A, and why
google-workspace scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 247 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Google Workspace — auth + calling Gmail/Drive/Calendar/Sheets
This skill owns one layer: authenticating to and calling the four Google Workspace REST APIs from server-side code. Everything here is service-account / machine auth — if a real user must click "Allow", that is interactive OAuth and out of scope.
Where the neighbouring layers live:
| Not this skill | Goes to | This skill's slice |
|---|---|---|
| SMTP/provider choice, transactional/marketing sends | email-connector |
Gmail-the-API inside a Workspace mailbox |
| SPF/DKIM, inbox placement | email-deliverability |
— |
| Availability search, booking-link UX, timezone-as-a-feature | calendar-scheduling |
Raw Calendar event CRUD underneath |
| Sheet data modeling, formulas, pivots | spreadsheet-ops |
Sheets API read/write transport |
| Doc/PDF parsing, extraction, OCR | document-processing |
Drive as storage transport (upload/download/move/permissions) |
| Chaining several connectors into one flow | automation-flows |
The individual Google calls |
| Notion as the backend / generic REST wrapping | notion-connector, api-connector-builder |
— |
| Receiving Gmail/Drive push notifications | webhooks |
— |
Pick your auth mode
Choose first — it dictates scopes, the Admin-console step, and the client build.
| Situation | Mode | Why |
|---|---|---|
| App owns the data (its own Drive folder, its own calendar, a shared drive it was added to) | Service account, no delegation | The SA is its own identity; no need to act as a human. Simplest, no Admin step. |
Must act AS each Workspace user (send from [email protected], read their inbox/calendar) |
Service account + domain-wide delegation + subject |
Gmail has no "shared mailbox via SA" — to touch a user's mail/calendar you impersonate them. Requires a Workspace admin to authorize the SA. |
| Code runs on GCP (Cloud Run, GKE, Functions) or CI with WIF | Keyless: Application Default Credentials / Workload Identity Federation | No long-lived key file to leak or rotate. The runtime mints short-lived tokens. Always prefer this when the platform supports it. |
What ships with it
5 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 247 lines · 111 tokens per session scan A 60fe958716c8
google-workspace is a skill published in the GitHub repository ericrisco/rsc-harness (82 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 111 tokens to every session and 3,289 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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