Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add evgenii-studitskikh/Claude-Code-SaaS-Studio --skill code-reviewgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/evgenii-studitskikh/Claude-Code-SaaS-StudioWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/evgenii-studitskikh/claude-code-saas-studio/code-review)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/evgenii-studitskikh/claude-code-saas-studio/code-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/evgenii-studitskikh/claude-code-saas-studio/code-review/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/evgenii-studitskikh/claude-code-saas-studio/code-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/evgenii-studitskikh/claude-code-saas-studio/code-review.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00054 | $0.00904 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00022 | $0.00362 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00011 | $0.00181 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00090 |
Grade A, and why
code-review scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 25 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Perform a structured, rule-driven review of the current working-tree diff, checking for the most critical SaaS security and correctness properties. Non-autonomous: all findings are reported as a prioritized list; nothing is changed without the user's explicit sign-off on each fix.
Phases
- Get the diff — read the current unstaged and staged changes. If no diff exists, ask the user which files or commits to review. Summarize the scope of the review (N files, N lines changed) before proceeding.
- Check for secrets — scan all changed files for patterns that look like hardcoded secrets: API keys, JWTs, connection strings, private keys, and Stripe secret keys. Any match is a BLOCKING finding. Cross-check that
.env.exampleuses placeholders and that.gitignorecovers.env*. - Verify RLS and tenant scoping — for any server action or route handler, confirm that: (a) the Supabase client is initialized with the session cookie (not the service role key unless justified), (b) all queries that touch tenant data include a tenant-scoping filter, and (c) tenant ID is never sourced from unvalidated client input.
- Validate Stripe handling — for any webhook handler, verify: (a)
stripe.webhooks.constructEventis called with the raw request body andSTRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET, (b) event types are handled with idempotency (check for a processed-event record or Supabase upsert pattern), and (c) the handler returns 200 quickly and does heavy work asynchronously if needed. - Check input validation — confirm that all server actions and route handlers validate inputs with Zod (or equivalent) before any database or Stripe call. Note any handler that accepts
anytyped input or skips validation. - QA coverage advisory (qa-engineer perspective) — scan the list of changed source files and check whether each has a corresponding test file (
*.test.*,*.spec.*, or a matching path undere2e/). For every changed file with no accompanying test, note it as a NOTE-level finding with the suggestion: "Consider running/write-teststo add coverage for this file." This check is advisory only — it does not block the review verdict. - Security pass advisory (security-engineer perspective) — perform a quick, targeted scan of the diff for the following patterns, each reported as a WARNING unless it overlaps with an already-BLOCKING finding from earlier phases: (a) any token-shaped string that looks like a committed secret not caught by phase 2, (b) server actions or route handlers that read tenant data without an explicit RLS or tenant-scoping guard, (c) server actions or route handlers that accept inputs without Zod validation, and (d) Stripe webhook handlers missing
stripe.webhooks.constructEvent. Skip any issue already reported in phases 2–5; this advisory only surfaces NEW test-coverage or security observations not already covered. Close this phase with: "For a comprehensive security review run/security-audit." This advisory does not auto-fix or block; all findings are reported for human review. - Report findings — present findings grouped by severity: BLOCKING (must fix before ship), WARNING (should fix), and NOTE (consider fixing). For each finding, include the file path, line reference, and a one-sentence fix suggestion. Under
fullreview, discuss each finding; underlean/solo, present the list and ask for a single go/no-go to apply suggested fixes. Once all findings are resolved or acknowledged, return to the skill that invoked this review (e.g.,/build-feature) or continue the current phase.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 25 lines · 54 tokens per session scan A 0f60e0510551
code-review is a skill published in the GitHub repository evgenii-studitskikh/Claude-Code-SaaS-Studio (2 stars, last pushed 4mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 54 tokens to every session and 904 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other skills, from other repositories
openlore-execute-refactor
Apply a confirmed .openlore/refactor-plan.md with a test gate after each change. Use when asked to execute or continue an OpenLore refactoring plan.
collab-audit
This skill should be used when the user types /collab-audit or requests AI collaboration diagnosis. Analyzes conversation history, artifacts, and work patterns to generate a 14-section AI Collaboration Audit. Behavioral analysis and feedback are bundled by design — separating them causes users to skip one, defeating…
doubt-driven-development
Subjects every non-trivial decision to a fresh-context adversarial review before it stands. Use when correctness matters more than speed, when working in unfamiliar code, when stakes are high (production, security-sensitive logic, irreversible operations), or any time a confident output would be cheaper to verify now…
openclaw-github-dedupe
Investigate a cluster of GitHub issues and PRs, determine canonical candidates, post duplicate/related status, preserve contributor credit, and execute cleanup actions. Supports autonomous mode for provided-link-only closeout, merge/fix follow-through, changelog, and post-merge issue/PR cleanup.
oak-adversarial-review
Use for every final review of a diff - an independent pass that assumes the change is wrong, accounts for every changed file, attacks it along fixed dimensions, fact-checks its own findings and ends in an explicit verdict. Use also when the user asks for a red-team or devil's-advocate review.
ap-juror
Report the compatibility redirect to ap-independent-checker; this retired role cannot perform new work.