Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/evgenii-studitskikh/claude-code-saas-studio/security-auditnpx skills add evgenii-studitskikh/Claude-Code-SaaS-Studio --skill security-auditgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/evgenii-studitskikh/Claude-Code-SaaS-StudioWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/evgenii-studitskikh/claude-code-saas-studio/security-audit)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/evgenii-studitskikh/claude-code-saas-studio/security-audit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/evgenii-studitskikh/claude-code-saas-studio/security-audit.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00059 | $0.00479 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00030 | $0.00239 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00012 | $0.00096 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00048 |
Grade A, and why
security-audit scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 5d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
Find and rank security risks before launch. Non-autonomous: report findings and proposed fixes; never auto-apply fixes without sign-off.
Phases
- Scope — Default to
diff(staged/branch changes vs the base branch). If there is no active diff (nothing staged and no changes vs the base branch), automatically fall back tofull(whole repo). Confirm the chosen scope with the user before proceeding. - Checklist pass — review against: auth/session checks on protected routes; Supabase RLS + tenant scoping (no client-supplied tenant id); secrets only in env (cross-check the validate-commit hook); input validation at boundaries (zod); Stripe webhook signature + idempotency; security headers (Content-Security-Policy (CSP), Strict-Transport-Security (HSTS), X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, X-Frame-Options, Referrer-Policy); error sanitization.
- Dependency audit — run
npm audit --omit=dev(if a project exists) and note high/critical advisories; confirm a committed lockfile. - Rank findings — fill
.claude/templates/security-audit.mdintodocs/specs/security-audit.mdwith each finding: title, severity (Critical/High/Medium/Low), location, and recommended fix. Honor review intensity. - Verdict — summarize: PASS (no open High/Critical) or BLOCK (list the blockers). This verdict is what
/launch-checklistreads.
Output
docs/specs/security-audit.md + a PASS/BLOCK verdict. Proposes fixes; applies nothing without approval.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 5d ago First seen · 22 lines · 59 tokens per session scan A b6bf4be5e83a
security-audit is a skill published in the GitHub repository evgenii-studitskikh/Claude-Code-SaaS-Studio (1 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 59 tokens to every session and 479 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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