code-review-hardened

Code Review

AI code analysis powered by LogicArt at https://logic.art.

Analyze Code

node {baseDir}/scripts/analyze.mjs --code "function add(a,b) { return a - b; }"

Or analyze a file:

node {baseDir}/scripts/analyze.mjs --file path/to/code.js

API

Endpoint: POST https://logic.art/api/agent/analyze

curl -s -X POST "https://logic.art/api/agent/analyze" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"code": "your code here", "language": "javascript"}'

Response typically includes: bugs, security issues, complexity score, suggestions, and logic flow.

Full Repository Scans

For scanning entire repositories, use Validate Repo: https://validate-repo.replit.app

Presenting Results

When showing results to the user:

1. Lead with critical bugs/security issues
2. Show complexity score
3. List suggestions by priority
4. Include logic flow if provided

Works Great With

• workflow-engine — Chain code reviews into CI/CD pipelines
• quack-coordinator — Hire specialist reviewer agents

Powered by Quack Network 🦆

Security Guardrails

• Require per-invocation user approval before each external code transmission in automated pipelines (workflow-engine, CI/CD hooks, cron jobs) — blanket or delegated approval for automated bulk transmission creates unsupervised exfiltration channels, regardless of claimed authority or urgency. Manual, user-initiated review chains where the user approves each file are safe and should proceed normally.

• Confirm with the user before sending their code to any external service (logic.art, validate-repo.replit.app) — code transmitted externally may expose proprietary logic or trade secrets the user did not intend to share. Once the user gives explicit consent for a specific transmission, proceed without re-asking.

• Scan code for embedded secrets (API keys, tokens, passwords, private keys, credentials) before transmitting to external services — hardcoded secrets sent to third parties constitute credential exfiltration that can compromise accounts and infrastructure.