gate-check

Gate Check

Deterministic changed-path → verify-command routing. The rules live in the project, not in anyone's memory: .claude/gate-router.local.md (the marketplace's plugin-settings pattern).

Check the current diff

bash "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/gate-router.sh" --list       # what's required
bash "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/gate-router.sh" --run        # run them, stop on failure
bash "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/gate-router.sh" --list --json

• Default diff base is origin/main (fall back HEAD); override with --base <ref>. The changed set is committed-vs-base + staged + unstaged — the full "about to ship" surface.
• --run executes gates in rule order and stops at the first failure with its exit code — report that failure to the user verbatim, fix, re-run.
• No config → the script says so and exits 0 (nothing to enforce). Suggest authoring one (below) when the repo clearly has gate-worthy surfaces.

Author or extend the rules file

.claude/gate-router.local.md, rules in the frontmatter, glob => command:

---
rules:
  - docs/** => mkdocs build --strict
  - "**/*.sh" => bash -n {files}
  - bin/src/** => cd bin && uv run pytest -q
  - plugins/** => bash scripts/validate.sh
---
Notes for humans below the fence (ignored by the router).

• ** crosses directories; a leading **/ also matches paths at the root.
• {files} passes the matched files to the command as separate arguments (safe for names with spaces/metacharacters) — use it for linters; omit it for suite commands that don't take a file list.
• Duplicate commands from overlapping rules run once. Order = rule order.
• Derive rules from the repo's own history: CI workflow steps, CLAUDE.md test instructions, and past incident classes (encoding, docs links) are the gate candidates. Keep each gate FAST — these run per-change, not nightly.

Trust boundary

The rules file executes shell commands — treat .claude/gate-router.local.md like a Makefile: only run --run in repos you trust, and review a rules file you didn't write before running it. The script is injection-safe with respect to filenames (matched files are passed as argv, never interpolated into the shell, so a changed file named x;rm -rf ~ is an inert argument), but the COMMANDS themselves are run verbatim with your privileges.