Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add fatihkan/badi --skill pentest-exploit-chaingit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/fatihkan/badiWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/fatihkan/badi/pentest-exploit-chain)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/fatihkan/badi/pentest-exploit-chain"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/fatihkan/badi/pentest-exploit-chain.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 1 finding, up to medium
- medium YARA Match · line 112 YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).Fix: Remove offensive tool references and exploit code. Legitimate agent skills should not contain penetration testing tools, exploit frameworks, or reconnaissance utilities.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00057 | $0.01556 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00028 | $0.00778 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00011 | $0.00311 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00156 |
Grade A, and why
pentest-exploit-chain scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 185 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
pentest-exploit-chain
Chaining individual low-to-medium severity findings into a full compromise chain. The highest value-add of engagement intelligence — human analysis only.
Triggers
- "can these findings be chained"
- "draw the kill chain"
- "low + medium = critical"
- "attack path simulation"
- "stealth + impact score"
Lockheed Cyber Kill Chain (7 step)
1. Reconnaissance — OSINT, port scan
2. Weaponization — exploit + payload combine
3. Delivery — phishing, drive-by, USB
4. Exploitation — vulnerability trigger
5. Installation — persistent foothold
6. Command & Control — beacon
7. Actions on Objectives — data exfil, destruction, ransom
MITRE ATT&CK Tactic Chain
TA0043 Reconnaissance
-> TA0001 Initial Access
-> TA0002 Execution
-> TA0003 Persistence
-> TA0004 Privilege Escalation
-> TA0005 Defense Evasion
-> TA0006 Credential Access
-> TA0007 Discovery
-> TA0008 Lateral Movement
-> TA0009 Collection
-> TA0011 Command and Control
-> TA0010 Exfiltration
-> TA0040 Impact
Chain Analysis Methodology
1. List all findings (low + medium + high)
2. For each finding: input requirement, output privilege/access
3. Match: output of finding A, input of finding B
4. Draw the path of steps (DAG)
5. Shortest path -> max impact
6. A stealth score (1-5) per step
7. Total stealth + impact -> chain rank
Stealth Scoring (1-5)
| Score | Type | Detection Likelihood |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Loud | EDR/SIEM auto block/alert |
| 2 | Noisy | Caught when a SOC analyst reviews it in 5 min |
| 3 | Moderate | Default rule insufficient, hunt query needed |
| 4 | Quiet | Only sophisticated hunt + threat intel |
| 5 | Stealth | Undetectable (zero-day, signed bin) |
Impact Scoring (1-5)
| Score | Type | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Recon | Information gathering (no data disclosure) |
| 2 | Limited | Single account compromise |
| 3 | Local | Single system compromise |
| 4 | Lateral | Multiple systems / DB access |
| 5 | Catastrophic | DA, ransomware, mass exfil |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- yesterday First seen · 185 lines · 57 tokens per session scan A 17e348476f9e
pentest-exploit-chain is a skill published in the GitHub repository fatihkan/badi (7 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 57 tokens to every session and 1,556 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-06.
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