Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add fatihkan/badi --skill pentest-threat-modelgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/fatihkan/badiWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/fatihkan/badi/pentest-threat-model)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/fatihkan/badi/pentest-threat-model"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/fatihkan/badi/pentest-threat-model/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/fatihkan/badi/pentest-threat-model"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/fatihkan/badi/pentest-threat-model.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector pass
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00063 | $0.01714 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00032 | $0.00857 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00013 | $0.00343 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00171 |
Grade A, and why
pentest-threat-model scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 194 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
pentest-threat-model
System threat modeling — STRIDE, DREAD, attack tree, DFD. Used at engagement start or in a design review.
Triggers
- "create a threat model"
- "STRIDE analysis"
- "DREAD scoring"
- "draw an attack tree"
- "data flow diagram"
- "MITRE ATT&CK matrix"
STRIDE (Microsoft)
| Letter | Threat | Counter Property |
|---|---|---|
| S | Spoofing identity | Authentication |
| T | Tampering with data | Integrity |
| R | Repudiation | Non-repudiation |
| I | Information disclosure | Confidentiality |
| D | Denial of service | Availability |
| E | Elevation of privilege | Authorization |
Apply STRIDE to every DFD element (Process, Data Store, Data Flow, Trust Boundary).
DREAD Scoring
| Dimension | 1 (Low) | 5 (High) | 10 (Critical) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Damage | Minimal | Major | Catastrophic |
| Reproducibility | Hard | Sometimes | Trivial |
| Exploitability | Hard | Moderate | Trivial (script) |
| Affected users | Few | Many | Most |
| Discoverability | Hidden | Apparent | Public docs |
Total: 50 max. High = high risk.
DFD Structure
[External Entity] --> ((Process)) --> [Data Store]
|
Trust Boundary
|
((Internal Service))
Components:
- External Entity (square): user, 3rd party API
- Process (circle): web server, microservice
- Data Store (cylinder): database, cache
- Data Flow (arrow): request/response
- Trust Boundary (dashed line): VPC boundary, network zone
Attack Tree Template
Goal: Steal credit card data
├── 1. Compromise web server
│ ├── 1.1 RCE via SQL injection
│ │ └── 1.1.1 Find SQLi in /api
│ ├── 1.2 Steal session cookie via XSS
│ └── 1.3 Brute force admin panel
├── 2. Compromise database directly
│ ├── 2.1 Internal port reachable
│ └── 2.2 Default credential
└── 3. Social engineer admin
├── 3.1 Phishing
└── 3.2 Vishing IT helpdesk
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 3d ago First seen · 194 lines · 63 tokens per session scan A c58404e1752b
pentest-threat-model is a skill published in the GitHub repository fatihkan/badi (7 stars, last pushed 3d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 63 tokens to every session and 1,714 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-06.
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