sc-cmdi

sc-cmdi is a skill for Claude Code from fatihkan/badi. It costs 18 tokens per session (1,295 once invoked), scanned B, a copy of sc-cmdi, MIT.

A security checker for OS command injection, where untrusted input is used to build shell commands or start processes. It distinguishes control of the whole command from control of its arguments.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it to review shell calls, subprocess APIs, and process-spawning code across supported programming languages for missing input protection.
Why use it?
It helps find places where an attacker could make the operating system run unintended commands. This reduces the risk of data theft, system changes, or other damage through unsafe process execution.

Skill for Claude Code

Written for Claude Code: installed under .claude/.

Part of the badi plugin — 81 skills, 86 commands, 30 agents, 7 hooks shipped together

Good fit Use it to review shell calls, subprocess APIs, and process-spawning code across supported programming languages for missing input protection.

Compare 6 skills from other repositories ↓
Install with agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/fatihkan/badi/sc-cmdi
Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

Any agent
npx skills add fatihkan/badi --skill sc-cmdi
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/fatihkan/badi

Made for: Claude Code.

Or install badi, the plugin that ships this one along with the rest of its 81 skills, 86 commands, 30 agents, 7 hooks.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for sc-cmdi

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/fatihkan/badi/sc-cmdi.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/skills/fatihkan/badi/sc-cmdi)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/fatihkan/badi/sc-cmdi"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/fatihkan/badi/sc-cmdi.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>
Per session 18 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 1,295 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan B 2 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe.
Origin 98% copy Near-identical to another mod in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00018 $0.01295
Opus 5 $0.00009 $0.00647
Sonnet 5 $0.00004 $0.00259
Haiku 4.5 $0.00002 $0.00129

Measured yesterday against content hash 59f5d37542c2, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-09-07, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade B, and why

sc-cmdi scanned grade B with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Recursive force deletemediumDestructive command

rm -rf with a variable or a broad path is one typo away from removing the wrong tree.

os.system(f"echo {user_input}") # user_input = "; rm -rf /"

Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.

Runs shell commandslowCapability

Expected in a hook, worth knowing in a rule or an instructions file.

"os.system(", "os.popen(", "subprocess.call(", "subprocess.run(",
Origin

This is a copy

98% identical to sc-cmdi — 1 line differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.

.claude/skills-vault/security-check/sc-cmdi/SKILL.md · 159 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 159 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

SC: Command Injection

Purpose

Detects OS command injection vulnerabilities where user-controlled input is passed to system shell commands, subprocess execution, or process spawning functions without proper sanitization. Distinguishes between full command injection (attacker controls the command) and argument injection (attacker controls arguments to a fixed command).

Activation

Called by sc-orchestrator during Phase 2. Runs against all detected languages.

Phase 1: Discovery

File Patterns to Search

**/*.py, **/*.js, **/*.ts, **/*.go, **/*.php, **/*.java, **/*.kt,
**/*.cs, **/*.rb, **/scripts/*, **/*exec*, **/*shell*, **/*command*,
**/*process*, **/*system*, **/*spawn*

Keyword Patterns to Search

# Python
"os.system(", "os.popen(", "subprocess.call(", "subprocess.run(",
"subprocess.Popen(", "subprocess.check_output(", "commands.getoutput(",
"shell=True"

# JavaScript/Node.js
"child_process.exec(", "child_process.execSync(",
"child_process.spawn(", "execFile(", "require('child_process')",
"shelljs", "execa"

# Go
"exec.Command(", "exec.CommandContext(", "os/exec"

# PHP
"exec(", "system(", "passthru(", "shell_exec(", "popen(",
"proc_open(", "pcntl_exec(", "backtick"

# Java
"Runtime.getRuntime().exec(", "ProcessBuilder(",
"new ProcessBuilder("

# C#
"Process.Start(", "ProcessStartInfo(",
"System.Diagnostics.Process"

# Ruby
"system(", "exec(", "IO.popen(", "`"

Data Flow Tracing

Sources: HTTP request parameters, file names from uploads, environment variables from user-controlled sources, database values originally from user input.

Sinks: All command execution functions listed above.

Phase 2: Verification

Command Injection vs Argument Injection

Command injection — attacker controls the full command or can inject shell operators:

# VULNERABLE: Full command injection
os.system(f"echo {user_input}")  # user_input = "; rm -rf /"

Argument injection — attacker controls arguments to a known-safe binary:

# VULNERABLE: Argument injection
subprocess.run(["git", "clone", user_url])  # user_url = "--upload-pack=evil"

Read the full file on GitHub · 159 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. yesterday First seen · 159 lines · 18 tokens per session scan B 59f5d37542c2

Subscribe to this mod's changes

sc-cmdi is a skill published in the GitHub repository fatihkan/badi (7 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 18 tokens to every session and 1,295 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 2 findings (recursive force delete, runs shell commands). It is 98% identical to sc-cmdi, differing in 1 line, and is treated as a copy.

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