Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add FlorianBruniaux/claude-code-plugins --skill ci-allgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/FlorianBruniaux/claude-code-pluginsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/florianbruniaux/claude-code-plugins/ci-all)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/florianbruniaux/claude-code-plugins/ci-all"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/florianbruniaux/claude-code-plugins/ci-all/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/florianbruniaux/claude-code-plugins/ci-all"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/florianbruniaux/claude-code-plugins/ci-all.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 4 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Tool Misuse · line 4 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 47 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 132 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 6 Skill selects an external model or provider that may use a different account or billing plan than the operator expects. Undisclosed model switches can cause unexpected cost or quota consumption.Fix: Remove the model/provider override or disclose it prominently and require explicit operator approval before invoking an external coding CLI or billed model.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00033 | $0.00865 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00013 | $0.00346 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00173 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00086 |
Grade A, and why
ci-all scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 136 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
/ci:all: Full CI before PR
Runs everything in order: local tests → type check → push → pipeline URL.
One /ci:all replaces: manual tests + git push + copying the pipeline URL.
Stack detection
if [ -f "uv.lock" ]; then STACK="python"
elif [ -f "pnpm-lock.yaml" ]; then STACK="node"
elif [ -f "package-lock.json" ]; then STACK="node-npm"
elif [ -f "Cargo.toml" ]; then STACK="rust"
fi
Step 1: Local tests (blocking)
Python (uv/pytest):
uv run pytest --tb=short -q
# Failure → STOP + print failing tests
Node (pnpm/vitest):
pnpm vitest run
pnpm tsc --noEmit
# Failure → STOP
Rust:
cargo test --quiet 2>&1
If --skip-tests is passed → skip to step 2.
Step 2: Push + pipeline
BRANCH=$(git branch --show-current)
# Verify commits exist to push
AHEAD=$(git rev-list --count origin/$BRANCH..HEAD 2>/dev/null || echo "1")
if [ "$AHEAD" = "0" ]; then
echo "Branch already up to date on origin."
else
git push origin "$BRANCH"
fi
Step 3: Pipeline URL
GitLab CI
REMOTE=$(git remote get-url origin)
WEB_URL=$(echo "$REMOTE" | sed 's/git@gitlab\.com:/https:\/\/gitlab.com\//' | sed 's/\.git$//')
echo "Pipeline: $WEB_URL/-/pipelines?ref=$BRANCH"
# Optional: live status via glab CLI
if command -v glab &>/dev/null; then
sleep 3
glab ci status --branch "$BRANCH" 2>/dev/null || true
fi
GitHub Actions
REMOTE=$(git remote get-url origin)
WEB_URL=$(echo "$REMOTE" | sed 's/git@github\.com:/https:\/\/github.com\//' | sed 's/\.git$//')
echo "Actions: $WEB_URL/actions?query=branch%3A$BRANCH"
# Optional: live status via gh CLI
if command -v gh &>/dev/null; then
sleep 5
gh run list --branch "$BRANCH" --limit 3 2>/dev/null || true
fi
Expected output
CI: my-app (Node/Vitest)
──────────────────────────
① Local tests
✅ 47 passed in 8.2s
② Type check
✅ No errors
③ Push
✅ origin/feat/my-feature
④ Pipeline
🔗 https://gitlab.com/org/my-app/-/pipelines?ref=feat/my-feature
Next step: open a PR with /pr or directly on GitLab/GitHub.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 136 lines · 33 tokens per session scan A 873b0b1fd6b5
ci-all is a skill published in the GitHub repository FlorianBruniaux/claude-code-plugins (43 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 33 tokens to every session and 865 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
devops
CI/CD, container orchestration, cloud architecture, monitoring, infrastructure security, and platform automation skills. Docker, Kubernetes, Terraform, GitHub Actions. Triggers on: CI/CD, Docker, Kubernetes, Terraform, deploy, monitoring, infra, GitOps, observability, SRE.
pentest-cicd
CI/CD red team methodology — GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Jenkins pipeline security analysis, secret leak, workflow injection advisory. Triggers on CI/CD pentest, GitHub Actions security, GitLab CI, Jenkins, pipeline injection, workflow injection, secret leak, OIDC abuse, runner takeover, supply chain.
sc-ci-cd
CI/CD pipeline security — GitHub Actions injection, secret exposure, untrusted actions, and artifact poisoning.
devops-cloud
DevOps, cloud infrastructure, and platform engineering. Use when working with AWS, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes, Terraform, CI/CD pipelines, or infrastructure as code.
agent-mobile-release-manager
Specialist subagent: App store submissions, mobile CI/CD, ASO, code signing, and beta distribution specialist. Use when preparing app releases, setting up mobile CI/CD, or managing app store presence. Trigger phrases: app store, Play Store, TestFlight, release, code signing, provisioning profile, Fastlane, ASO, beta…
agent-devsecops-engineer
Specialist subagent: CI/CD security, SAST/DAST pipelines, supply chain security, container scanning, and security automation specialist. Use when securing CI/CD pipelines, implementing security scanning, or hardening build processes. Trigger phrases: DevSecOps, SAST, DAST, supply chain security, container scanning…