Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add FlorianBruniaux/claude-code-plugins --skill ci-pipelinegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/FlorianBruniaux/claude-code-pluginsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/florianbruniaux/claude-code-plugins/ci-pipeline)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/florianbruniaux/claude-code-plugins/ci-pipeline"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/florianbruniaux/claude-code-plugins/ci-pipeline/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/florianbruniaux/claude-code-plugins/ci-pipeline"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/florianbruniaux/claude-code-plugins/ci-pipeline.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 1 finding, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Excessive Agency · line 6 Skill selects an external model or provider that may use a different account or billing plan than the operator expects. Undisclosed model switches can cause unexpected cost or quota consumption.Fix: Remove the model/provider override or disclose it prominently and require explicit operator approval before invoking an external coding CLI or billed model.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00021 | $0.00668 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00267 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00134 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00067 |
Grade A, and why
ci-pipeline scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
/ci:pipeline: Push and trigger pipeline
Pushes the current branch and returns the pipeline tracking link.
Process
BRANCH=$(git branch --show-current)
# 1. Safety checks
if echo "$BRANCH" | grep -qE "^(main|master|production)$"; then
echo "❌ Direct push to $BRANCH is not allowed. Create a feature/fix branch."
exit 1
fi
# 2. Check for uncommitted changes
UNCOMMITTED=$(git status --porcelain | wc -l | tr -d ' ')
if [ "$UNCOMMITTED" -gt 0 ]; then
echo "⚠️ $UNCOMMITTED uncommitted file(s):"
git status --short
echo ""
echo "Commit first with /commit or git add + git commit"
exit 0
fi
# 3. Push
echo "Pushing → origin/$BRANCH"
git push origin "$BRANCH" 2>&1
Pipeline URL
GitLab CI
REMOTE=$(git remote get-url origin 2>/dev/null || echo "")
WEB_URL=$(echo "$REMOTE" | sed 's/git@gitlab\.com:/https:\/\/gitlab.com\//' | sed 's/\.git$//')
echo ""
echo "✅ Push OK"
echo " Pipeline: $WEB_URL/-/pipelines?ref=$BRANCH"
# Live status via glab (if installed)
if command -v glab &>/dev/null; then
sleep 3
glab ci status --branch "$BRANCH" 2>/dev/null || true
fi
GitHub Actions
REMOTE=$(git remote get-url origin 2>/dev/null || echo "")
WEB_URL=$(echo "$REMOTE" | sed 's/git@github\.com:/https:\/\/github.com\//' | sed 's/\.git$//')
echo ""
echo "✅ Push OK"
echo " Actions: $WEB_URL/actions?query=branch%3A$BRANCH"
# Live status via gh (if installed)
if command -v gh &>/dev/null; then
sleep 5
gh run list --branch "$BRANCH" --limit 3 2>/dev/null || true
fi
Expected output
Pushing → origin/feat/add-payment-retry
Enumerating objects: 12, done.
...
✅ Push OK
Pipeline: https://gitlab.com/org/my-app/-/pipelines?ref=feat/add-payment-retry
Pipeline status (after 3s):
⏳ lint running
⏸️ test waiting
⏸️ deploy waiting
Usage
/ci:pipeline
Target: $ARGUMENTS
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 98 lines · 21 tokens per session scan A 2f1bd3cf6d17
ci-pipeline is a skill published in the GitHub repository FlorianBruniaux/claude-code-plugins (43 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 21 tokens to every session and 668 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
devops
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ci-and-branch-protection
How CI gates and GitHub branch protection actually behave on this solo free-tier account — the zero-coverage hole in aggregate jobs, the 403 on private repos, and the three traps that permanently deadlock a solo merge. Load before writing or changing a CI gate, adding a pr-gate caller, or setting/checking branch…
pentest-cicd
CI/CD red team methodology — GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Jenkins pipeline security analysis, secret leak, workflow injection advisory. Triggers on CI/CD pentest, GitHub Actions security, GitLab CI, Jenkins, pipeline injection, workflow injection, secret leak, OIDC abuse, runner takeover, supply chain.
sc-diff-report
Incremental security scan for changed files only — optimized for PR and commit-level reviews.
sc-ci-cd
CI/CD pipeline security — GitHub Actions injection, secret exposure, untrusted actions, and artifact poisoning.
devops-cicd
Build robust CI/CD pipelines with GitHub Actions, Docker containers, infrastructure as code, deployment strategies (blue-green, canary), and monitoring. Automate everything from commit to production.