Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to fulminate-io/knowledge-mcp. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/fulminate-io/knowledge-mcp/main/.claude/skills/select-patterns/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/fulminate-io/knowledge-mcpWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/fulminate-io/knowledge-mcp/select-patterns)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/fulminate-io/knowledge-mcp/select-patterns"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/fulminate-io/knowledge-mcp/select-patterns.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00049 | $0.00702 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00024 | $0.00351 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00010 | $0.00140 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00070 |
Grade A, and why
select-patterns scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 65 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
SELECT-PATTERNS — what the planner will faithfully build to
Tickets carry two independent pattern lists: pattern_ids (architecture —
PRESCRIPTIVE: the planner BUILDS to whatever is attached) and
language_patterns (language anti-patterns — DEFENSIVE: vigilance markers
shaping review, not the build).
Attachment discipline
Attach pattern_ids when the pattern is structurally load-bearing — the work IS an instance of the pattern, or the planner needs it as the canonical shape. Use no_patterns_reason when none is. Don't ask permission to attach an obvious match — and don't pile on mediocre matches to look thorough, because the planner WILL build to whatever is attached.
| Condition | Action |
|---|---|
| auto-suggest ≥ 0.65 + obvious match | attach without asking |
| multiple high-confidence patterns shaping distinct facets | attach 3-4 max |
| medium 0.40-0.65 "kind of fits" | verify or skip — never attach mediocre matches |
| user says "no patterns" / "skip" | honor it; no_patterns_reason; do NOT counter-propose |
| trivial / doc-only / scope-narrow / sui-generis | no_patterns_reason |
Discovery fans out: patterns live across multiple practice graphs — search them
as a set (search({graph:"practice", language:"all", queries:[...]})). Never
conclude "no pattern fits" from a single-graph miss.
The failure this table exists for: a ticket attached a registry pattern because it "kind of fit"; the planner faithfully built exported Register/Unregister with panic-on-duplicate, a mutex, and dedicated tests — for a closed set of three ops where a plain switch was one screen of code.
language_patterns (defensive)
When the ticket's language has an anti-pattern corpus, enumerate
deterministically (query({graph:"practice", language:"<lang>", type:"finding", meta:{"dsl_pattern":"*"}, fields:[...]})). Attach only when
the implementation surface plausibly touches the anti-pattern AND the user
agrees — 3-4 strong matches is plenty; never bulk-attach. No language surface →
leave empty; the empty case is the default.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 65 lines · 49 tokens per session scan A 24b1924defec
select-patterns is a skill published in the GitHub repository fulminate-io/knowledge-mcp (1 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 49 tokens to every session and 702 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-04.
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