Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add gensecaihq/Wazuh-Autopilot --skill ioc-enrichmentgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/gensecaihq/Wazuh-AutopilotWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/gensecaihq/wazuh-autopilot/ioc-enrichment)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/gensecaihq/wazuh-autopilot/ioc-enrichment"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/gensecaihq/wazuh-autopilot/ioc-enrichment/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/gensecaihq/wazuh-autopilot/ioc-enrichment"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/gensecaihq/wazuh-autopilot/ioc-enrichment.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00048 | $0.00996 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00019 | $0.00398 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00010 | $0.00199 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00100 |
Grade A, and why
ioc-enrichment scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 78 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
IOC Enrichment
Turn raw indicators into decisions: block, watch, or ignore. NIST CSF 2.0 ID.RA (threat intelligence informs risk) and DE.AE (context for adverse events).
Procedure
get_case— list indicators with roleattackerorobservedthat are public: public IPs, internet domains, URLs, file hashes.- For each (max 20 per run, attacker-role first):
check_ioc_reputation(indicator=...)— reputation verdict and sources.analyze_security_threat(indicator=..., indicator_type=...)— threat context.search_security_events(query=<indicator>, srcip=<ip>, time_range="7d")— internal sightings (how many hosts?). For hashes, check whether the Wazuh VirusTotal integration already scored the file: rule 87105 (level 12) means positives were found; rule 87104 means none; rules 87101, 87102 are integration errors (rate limit, credentials), not verdicts.get_wazuh_alerts(rule_groups=["virustotal"])lists them. Loadwazuh-malware-detectionfor detail.
- Optionally
search_external_contextfor public reporting — see egress rules. - Grade each source with the Admiralty Code; combine into a verdict.
Egress rules for search_external_context
search_external_context sends the query outside the environment (third-party web
search). Only send:
- Public IPs, public domains/URLs, file hashes, CVE ids, malware/actor names.
Never send: internal hostnames, internal IPs (RFC 1918 etc.), usernames, email addresses, case ids, customer names, file paths, or raw log lines. If unsure, don't send. Respect TLP: indicators received as TLP:RED or TLP:AMBER+STRICT must not be queried externally.
Admiralty Code (NATO / STANAG 2511)
Source reliability: A completely reliable · B usually reliable · C fairly reliable · D not usually reliable · E unreliable · F cannot be judged. Information credibility: 1 confirmed by other sources · 2 probably true · 3 possibly true · 4 doubtful · 5 improbable · 6 cannot be judged.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- yesterday First seen · 78 lines · 48 tokens per session scan A 9feb9d0c62c3
ioc-enrichment is a skill published in the GitHub repository gensecaihq/Wazuh-Autopilot (57 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 48 tokens to every session and 996 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-25.
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