Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add gensecaihq/Wazuh-Autopilot --skill wazuh-malware-detectiongit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/gensecaihq/Wazuh-AutopilotWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/gensecaihq/wazuh-autopilot/wazuh-malware-detection)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/gensecaihq/wazuh-autopilot/wazuh-malware-detection"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/gensecaihq/wazuh-autopilot/wazuh-malware-detection/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/gensecaihq/wazuh-autopilot/wazuh-malware-detection"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/gensecaihq/wazuh-autopilot/wazuh-malware-detection.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00063 | $0.01372 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00025 | $0.00549 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00013 | $0.00274 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00137 |
Grade A, and why
wazuh-malware-detection scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 68 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Wazuh Malware Detection
Wazuh has no single malware engine; it aggregates several sources. Know which one fired, because their reliability differs.
Sources (stock ruleset)
| Source | Rules / group | Reliability notes |
|---|---|---|
| VirusTotal integration (FIM hash lookups) | group virustotal; rule 87105 (level 12, engines detected the file), rule 87104 (level 3, no positives), rule 87103 (level 3, not in VT database), rule 87101 (level 3, API rate limit), rule 87102 (level 3, check credentials) |
Good signal when many engines agree (virustotal.positives); "not in database" on a new executable in a temp path is itself suspicious |
| Rootcheck | group rootcheck; rule 510 (level 7, host-based anomaly), rule 513 (level 9, Windows malware detected), rule 518 (level 9, Windows adware/spyware), rule 521 (level 11, possible kernel level rootkit), rule 519 (level 7, vulnerable web application found) |
Signature/heuristic checks; rule 510 is a parent — read the child or full_log for the specific finding. Known false positives on some kernels/containers |
| ClamAV (if deployed) | group virus; rule 52502 (level 8, "ClamAV: Virus detected") |
Signature-based, good for known malware on Linux file servers |
| Microsoft Antimalware / Defender events | group mse; rule 7703 (level 5, error event) |
Only if the Defender event channel is collected |
| Sysmon detections | groups sysmon_eid1_detections, sysmon_eid3_detections, sysmon_eid7_detections, sysmon_eid8_detections, sysmon_eid10_detections, sysmon_eid11_detections, sysmon_eid13_detections |
Behavioural. Examples: rule 92213 (level 15, executable dropped in a folder commonly used by malware), rule 92104 (level 15, suspicious binary created network connection), rule 92900 (level 12, LSASS accessed with read permissions), rule 92400 (level 12, possible code injection on explorer.exe) |
| Office 365 | rule 91700 (level 14, detected malware in file), rule 91556 (level 12, phishing and malware events from Exchange Online Protection / Defender) | Cloud mailbox/file detections |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- yesterday First seen · 68 lines · 63 tokens per session scan A 89134dd6d2f8
wazuh-malware-detection is a skill published in the GitHub repository gensecaihq/Wazuh-Autopilot (57 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 63 tokens to every session and 1,372 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-25.
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