Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add glebis/claude-skills --skill anongit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/glebis/claude-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/glebis/claude-skills/anon)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/glebis/claude-skills/anon"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/glebis/claude-skills/anon/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/glebis/claude-skills/anon"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/glebis/claude-skills/anon.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector pass
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00203 | $0.01302 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00081 | $0.00521 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00041 | $0.00260 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00020 | $0.00130 |
Grade A, and why
anon scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 74 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
confide:anon — local PII redaction
Redact personally identifying information from a transcript (or a whole folder) using the
layered local stack in shared/confide_core.py: regex (emails / URLs / phones / IDs / dates)
→ Natasha (RU named entities) → local LLM (quasi-identifiers). Spans are interval-merged and
replaced with placeholders. The result is a GREEN copy safe to review.
By default anon emits a reversible map: unique reserved-sentinel placeholders (the same
EXACT value always becomes the same [CONFIDE_<TYPE>_<NNNN>], e.g. [CONFIDE_PERSON_0001],
[CONFIDE_EMAIL_0001], [CONFIDE_DATE_0002]) plus a sibling <name>.map.json (structured:
schema_version, doc_id, green_sha256, created, entries[]) mapping each placeholder to
its original. The CONFIDE_ sentinel is reserved — a real transcript essentially never
contains it, so there is no collision risk and rehydrate never touches ordinary prose like
"Person 1". This is exact-value matching, not entity coreference: inflected forms (e.g. RU
"Марина" vs "Марины") are SEPARATE placeholders (no lemmatized merge). That map is the
secret — the ONLY artifact with originals; it stays local and enables
confide:rehydrate to put real values back into a cloud analysis of the GREEN text
(round-trip: redact → analyze the green → rehydrate locally). Use --no-map for the legacy
non-reversible [TYPE] style (no map written).
Privacy invariants (do not violate)
- Local-only. No cloud APIs. Raw text never leaves the machine.
- By design, original PII is written ONLY to the local, 0600, gitignored
<name>.map.json, which never leaves the machine. It is never printed, and never written to the GREEN copy (the GREEN holds placeholders only; the original file is read, never rewritten). The map is the SECRET — the one artifact with originals. A.gitignorecovering*.map.json,*.view.html, and*.restored.mdis written/updated in the output dir so these local-only artifacts can never be committed. If the output dir looks cloud-synced (iCloud / Dropbox / OneDrive / Google Drive), anon prints a WARNING that the secret map would be uploaded. - Counts only. stdout and the
*.stats.jsonfiles carry counts (by type, by layer, redaction rate) — never PII values or redacted text dumps. - Human review still required. Redaction is a floor, not a guarantee. A human must read the GREEN copy before sharing. Pair with confide:red to check residual re-identification risk.
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2mo ago First seen · 74 lines · 203 tokens per session scan A 840e9f4302a8
anon is a skill published in the GitHub repository glebis/claude-skills (409 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 203 tokens to every session and 1,302 once invoked, about $0.0008 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
anon compared with skills from other repositories
| Mod | Type | Stars | Last push | Licence | Scan | Tokens | Works with |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| anonglebis/claude-skills | Skill | 409 | yesterday | MIT | A | 203 | Claude Code |
| tastemakercodeswithroh/tastemaker | Skill | 524 | 26d ago | MIT | A | 202 | Claude Code |
| fdesuboss87/FDEOps | Skill | 857 | 17d ago | MIT | A | 125 | Claude Code, Codex |
| board-memosuboss87/FDEOps | Skill | 857 | 17d ago | MIT | A | 31 | Claude Code, Codex |
| briefsuboss87/FDEOps | Skill | 857 | 17d ago | MIT | A | 32 | Claude Code, Codex |
| business-casesuboss87/FDEOps | Skill | 857 | 17d ago | MIT | A | 29 | Claude Code, Codex |
| earn-trustsuboss87/FDEOps | Skill | 857 | 17d ago | MIT | A | 26 | Claude Code, Codex |