Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add glebis/claude-skills --skill auditgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/glebis/claude-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/glebis/claude-skills/audit)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/glebis/claude-skills/audit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/glebis/claude-skills/audit/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/glebis/claude-skills/audit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/glebis/claude-skills/audit.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector pass
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00184 | $0.00912 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00074 | $0.00365 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00037 | $0.00182 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00018 | $0.00091 |
Grade A, and why
audit scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 63 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
confide:audit — corpus-scale, stats-only PII audit
Measure how much PII lives across a whole folder of sessions, without ever exposing any
of it. The audit runs the layered LOCAL detector stack from shared/confide_core.py
(regex → Natasha → local LLM) over each file and emits only aggregates. This mirrors
the real_session_eval privacy contract: read text only in-process, emit counts.
Privacy invariants (do not violate)
- Local-only. No cloud APIs. Raw transcript text never leaves the machine.
- Stats-only output. The report (markdown + json + optional HTML) contains ONLY counts and rates — never a transcript substring, never a detected PII value.
- No filenames. Per-file rows are keyed by anonymized ids
own-00,own-01, … The original path/name is never written or printed. On an unreadable file, only the index + exception class name is recorded. - Safe to surface. Because it is counts-only, the aggregate report can be shared with a cloud agent or pasted into a chat. The PII stays on the machine.
What it reports
n_files, total / mean / min / max document charsspans_by_type(PERSON, EMAIL, PHONE, DATE, …) andspans_by_layer(regex / natasha / llm)overall_redaction_rateplus the per-session redaction-rate distribution (min / median / mean / max)- a coarse residual proxy: spans still detectable after redaction — ~0 on a clean RED corpus, a leakage signal on a GREEN corpus.
Run it
Point it at a folder (recurses, processes every .md/.txt; skips confide's own
*.green.md / *.stats.json outputs):
python3 skills/audit/scripts/audit.py FOLDER
Options:
--list paths.txt— also/instead audit absolute paths listed one per line.--layers regex,natasha,llm— choose detection layers (default from config). Use--layers regexfor a fully offline, deterministic pass (no models/network).--out report.md— report path; areport.jsonsibling is written alongside.--html— also write a Tufte-ish dashboard (report.html, counts only).
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2mo ago First seen · 63 lines · 184 tokens per session scan A 391764927e11
audit is a skill published in the GitHub repository glebis/claude-skills (409 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 184 tokens to every session and 912 once invoked, about $0.0007 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
audit compared with skills from other repositories
| Mod | Type | Stars | Last push | Licence | Scan | Tokens | Works with |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| auditglebis/claude-skills | Skill | 409 | yesterday | MIT | A | 184 | Claude Code |
| tastemakercodeswithroh/tastemaker | Skill | 524 | 26d ago | MIT | A | 202 | Claude Code |
| fdesuboss87/FDEOps | Skill | 857 | 17d ago | MIT | A | 125 | Claude Code, Codex |
| board-memosuboss87/FDEOps | Skill | 857 | 17d ago | MIT | A | 31 | Claude Code, Codex |
| briefsuboss87/FDEOps | Skill | 857 | 17d ago | MIT | A | 32 | Claude Code, Codex |
| business-casesuboss87/FDEOps | Skill | 857 | 17d ago | MIT | A | 29 | Claude Code, Codex |
| earn-trustsuboss87/FDEOps | Skill | 857 | 17d ago | MIT | A | 26 | Claude Code, Codex |