litert-conversion-workflow

litert-conversion-workflow is a skill for Claude Code, Codex from google-ai-edge/litert-samples. It costs 132 tokens per session (2,353 once invoked), scanned A, original, Apache-2.0.

A workflow for converting a Hugging Face language or vision-language model checkpoint into a `.litertlm` bundle for the LiteRT-LM runtime. It covers conversion, quantization, loading, generation, and quality checks on the intended device path.

In plain words
What is it for?
Preparing text or vision-language models for LiteRT-LM, choosing a conversion approach, testing generated output against the source model, and verifying the target device and backend.
Why use it?
A model can convert successfully but fail to run, lose quality after quantization, or break during a multi-turn conversation. The workflow checks these failure points in order.

Skill for Claude CodeCodex

Written for no agent in particular: nothing here depends on one.

Good fit Preparing text or vision-language models for LiteRT-LM, choosing a conversion approach, testing generated output against the source model, and verifying the target device and backend.

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Install with agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/google-ai-edge/litert-samples/litert-conversion-workflow
Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

Any agent
npx skills add google-ai-edge/litert-samples --skill litert-conversion-workflow
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/google-ai-edge/litert-samples

Made for: Claude Code, Codex.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for litert-conversion-workflow

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/google-ai-edge/litert-samples/litert-conversion-workflow/github.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/skills/google-ai-edge/litert-samples/litert-conversion-workflow)
Your own site
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Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for litert-conversion-workflow

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/google-ai-edge/litert-samples/litert-conversion-workflow"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/google-ai-edge/litert-samples/litert-conversion-workflow.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 132 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 2,353 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe. Third-party audits
  • NVIDIA SkillSpector pass 7 Sept 2026
How audits are shown
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00132 $0.02353
Opus 5.5 $0.00053 $0.00941
Sonnet 5.5 $0.00026 $0.00471
Haiku 4.5 $0.00013 $0.00235

Measured 20d ago against content hash 5207a53fa29a, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-10-07, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

litert-conversion-workflow scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 20d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

skills/litert-conversion-workflow/SKILL.md · 162 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 162 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

LiteRT-LM conversion workflow

A conversion is done when three things hold, in this order:

  1. the bundle loads and generates through the LiteRT-LM engine (not just the raw .tflite graphs),
  2. output quality is gated against the source model — a floor gate plus a task-level parity check, not a smoke test,
  3. it holds up on the deployment path it claims: the target backend, the target device, and multi-turn conversation.

Each step can pass while the next one fails. A bundle that converts can die at engine creation; an engine that generates can be quantization garbage; a model that answers 8/8 single-turn can crash on message two. The gates exist because every one of these has happened.

Scope: models producing a .litertlm bundle consumed by the LiteRT-LM engine (pip install litert-lm) — text LLMs and vision-language models (a VLM bundle is an LLM bundle plus two vision graphs; references/vlm-conversion.md covers the delta). Standalone/classic .tflite models go through the gpu-clean-conversion → accuracy-safe-quantization → on-device-verification lane; this skill is the LM sibling and reuses their discipline where it applies.

Step 0: classify before you convert

Look at config.json (model_type, layer_types, MoE fields, size) before running anything. Architecture decides everything downstream, and some structures die at a known point no recipe can route around. references/architecture-walls.md is the lookup table: structure → where it dies (export / load / engine / backend) → the error signature you'll see. Check it first; it turns a day of debugging into a table lookup.

Then pick the lane in references/recipe-selector.md: plain dense decoders ride a standard export; hybrids (SSM / linear-attention / short-conv) need state-aware export plus executor metadata; reasoning models need template care; MoE and MLA are currently walls.

Loop

1. Export with a minimal, extraction-safe template. The single most common ship-killer is not math — it is the chat template. Export with use_jinja_template=False and a minimal ChatML-style template swapped in, so the bundle carries plain prefix/suffix markers and no Jinja at all. Vendor templates routinely call Python methods (.get(), .startswith(), .strip()) that the runtime's minijinja renderer does not implement — such a bundle imports fine and dies on the first message. Details, the multi-turn prefix contract, and the tokenizer traps that pair with this: references/template-tokenizer-traps.md.

Read the full file on GitHub · 162 lines

Files

What ships with it

5 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 20d ago Changed 5207a53fa29a
  2. 27d ago Changed 6e9463090e1c
  3. 2mo ago First seen · 162 lines · 132 tokens per session scan A f0db444f8aeb

Subscribe to this mod's changes

litert-conversion-workflow is a skill published in the GitHub repository google-ai-edge/litert-samples (486 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 132 tokens to every session and 2,353 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.

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