Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/google-ai-edge/litert-samples/litert-conversion-workflownpx skills add google-ai-edge/litert-samples --skill litert-conversion-workflowgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/google-ai-edge/litert-samplesWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/google-ai-edge/litert-samples/litert-conversion-workflow)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/google-ai-edge/litert-samples/litert-conversion-workflow"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/google-ai-edge/litert-samples/litert-conversion-workflow.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00132 | $0.02335 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00066 | $0.01167 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00026 | $0.00467 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00013 | $0.00233 |
Grade A, and why
litert-conversion-workflow scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 5d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 162 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
LiteRT-LM conversion workflow
A conversion is done when three things hold, in this order:
- the bundle loads and generates through the LiteRT-LM engine (not just the raw interpreter),
- output quality is gated against the source model — a floor gate plus a task-level parity check, not a smoke test,
- it holds up on the deployment path it claims: the target backend, the target device, and multi-turn conversation.
Each step can pass while the next one fails. A bundle that converts can die at engine creation; an engine that generates can be quantization garbage; a model that answers 8/8 single-turn can crash on message two. The gates exist because every one of these has happened.
Scope: models producing a .litertlm bundle consumed by the LiteRT-LM
engine (pip install litert-lm) — text LLMs and vision-language models
(a VLM bundle is an LLM bundle plus two vision graphs;
references/vlm-conversion.md covers the delta). Standalone/classic
.tflite models go through the gpu-clean-conversion →
accuracy-safe-quantization → on-device-verification lane; this skill
is the LM sibling and reuses their discipline where it applies.
Step 0: classify before you convert
Look at config.json (model_type, layer_types, MoE fields, size)
before running anything. Architecture decides everything downstream,
and some structures die at a known point no recipe can route around.
references/architecture-walls.md is the lookup table: structure → where
it dies (export / load / engine / backend) → the error signature you'll
see. Check it first; it turns a day of debugging into a table lookup.
Then pick the lane in references/recipe-selector.md: plain dense
decoders ride a standard export; hybrids (SSM / linear-attention /
short-conv) need state-aware export plus executor metadata; reasoning
models need template care; MoE and MLA are currently walls.
Loop
1. Export with a minimal, extraction-safe template. The single most
common ship-killer is not math — it is the chat template. Export with
use_jinja_template=False and a minimal ChatML-style template swapped in,
so the bundle carries plain prefix/suffix markers and no Jinja at all.
Vendor templates routinely call Python methods (.get(), .startswith(),
.strip()) that the runtime's minijinja renderer does not implement — such
a bundle imports fine and dies on the first message. Details, the
multi-turn prefix contract, and the tokenizer traps that pair with this:
references/template-tokenizer-traps.md.
What ships with it
5 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 5d ago First seen · 162 lines · 132 tokens per session scan A f0db444f8aeb
litert-conversion-workflow is a skill published in the GitHub repository google-ai-edge/litert-samples (417 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 132 tokens to every session and 2,335 once invoked, about $0.0007 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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