google/mantis is a modular set of security-review skills that coding agents use to find, reproduce, and patch software vulnerabilities. It is for adapting automated security testing to application, infrastructure, machine-learning, hardware, and firmware projects, with expert review required for results. The catalogue skills and instruction provide the workflow for using Mantis with coding agents.
Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/google/mantisnpx agentmods add skills/google/mantis/mantis-chainWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/google/mantis/mantis-chain)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/google/mantis/mantis-chain"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/google/mantis/mantis-chain/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/google/mantis/mantis-chain"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/google/mantis/mantis-chain.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- Socket warn
- Snyk pass
- NVIDIA SkillSpector pass
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00050 | $0.05787 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00020 | $0.02315 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00010 | $0.01157 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00579 |
Grade A, and why
mantis-chain scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 397 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Vulnerability Chainer (/mantis-chain)
System Goal
Exploit Chain Architect. Analyzes isolated, individually-validated security findings and historical knowledge base primitives to identify and construct complex, multi-step exploit chains.
Command Definition
- Command:
/mantis-chain - Description: Analyzes individual security findings to identify and construct complex exploit chains.
- Arguments (all optional; supplied by the orchestrator per the harness
lifecycle contract — see
schema.json"Non-JSON Contracts"):--snapshot_root/SNAPSHOT_ROOT— the pinned, immutable code snapshot root for this pass. Consumed by Block A.--snapshot_id/SNAPSHOT_ID— the snapshot identity string for this pass. Consumed by Block A (sentinel) and Block B (match check).--state_root— parent directory ofworkspace/. When absent, defaults to the current directory (Block A step 1c/1d).--target_root— an already-prepared tree that OVERRIDES the snapshot root (rarely used by this stage; honored by Block A step 1a). When NONE of these are passed, Block A falls back toactive_snapshotinworkspace/.mantis_state.json; if that is absent too, the stage runs MODE-OFF (snapshot_pinned = false) and behaves exactly as today (see Backward-compat).
Input/Output Contract
- Reads:
workspace/findings/(validated finding JSON files where status is"VALID", and viability is"VIABLE","CONDITIONAL_VIABLE", or"SAMPLE_OR_TEST").workspace/kb/entities/*.mdandworkspace/kb/vulnerabilities/*.md(knowledge base primitives).workspace/.mantis_state.json(to track current loop pass).
- Writes:
- Net-new exploit chain finding JSON files to
workspace/findings/<new_uuid>.json. Original findings are left unmodified.
- Net-new exploit chain finding JSON files to
- Preconditions:
- Validated or viable findings must exist in
workspace/findings/.
- Validated or viable findings must exist in
- Idempotency Guarantee:
- Before writing a new exploit chain finding, the skill must check existing
exploit chain findings by comparing the constituent finding sequence. Scan
BOTH the current
workspace/findings/directory AND every archived pass underworkspace/archive/findings_pass_*/AND legacyworkspace/archive/loop*_findings/(all STATE-RELATIVE — never prefixCODE_ROOT). A chain JSON is any finding whoseconstituent_findingsarray is present and non-empty. If a chain with the EXACT same ordered constituent sequence already exists in EITHER location, skip creating a duplicate. - Signature-keyed idempotency (preferred) — with a code_paths tiebreak: If
ALL constituent findings have a
signaturefield, compare the ordered constituentsignaturesequence (not UUIDs). Treat two chains as the SAME (and skip creating the new one) ONLY IF their orderedsignaturesequences are equal AND, for each corresponding constituent pair, at least onecode_pathsentry (line-inclusive, i.e. compared WITH its trailing:line) is identical. If the signature sequences match but any corresponding constituent'scode_pathsdiffer, the chains are DISTINCT — create the new chain. (Over-reporting is safe; asignaturecollision must never suppress a genuinely new exploit chain, becausesignaturestrips line numbers and can collide between distinct same-file bugs.) - UUID fallback (today's behavior): If ANY constituent finding lacks a
signaturefield, fall back to comparing the ordered constituent UUID sequence exactly as before. This preserves today's behavior for legacy / un-upgraded findings. - This archive scan is now fully effective with stable finding signatures: two
chains whose constituents share the same signatures are correctly
deduplicated across passes. When signatures are absent (legacy findings),
the scan remains HARMLESS — it cannot falsely suppress a legitimate new
chain (no silent dropped result) and simply prevents exact-UUID
re-duplication within a resumed / rerun pass. If the
workspace/archive/directory does not exist, treat the archived set as empty and proceed.
- Before writing a new exploit chain finding, the skill must check existing
exploit chain findings by comparing the constituent finding sequence. Scan
BOTH the current
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 397 lines · 50 tokens per session scan A 0705f2b167e1
mantis-chain is a skill published in the GitHub repository google/mantis (2,525 stars, last pushed today), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 50 tokens to every session and 5,787 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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