Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/gtrabanco/agentic-workflow/audit-prnpx skills add gtrabanco/agentic-workflow --skill audit-prgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/gtrabanco/agentic-workflowWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/gtrabanco/agentic-workflow/audit-pr)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/gtrabanco/agentic-workflow/audit-pr"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/gtrabanco/agentic-workflow/audit-pr.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00071 | $0.02651 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00036 | $0.01326 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00014 | $0.00530 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00265 |
Grade A, and why
audit-pr scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured today.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 205 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Audit PR
The manager's "can this ship?" gate. A read-first audit over the entire PR —
its SPEC, all phases, docs, CI status, and review receipt — that returns a single
verdict: merge-ready or a ranked list of blockers. Never edits,
refactors, or merges. The human merges, or an active
ship-roadmap --fullauto invocation consumes the SHA-bound verdict and performs
its separate fail-closed merge step.
audit-pr does not re-review the diff. It consumes the current SHA-bound
review-change receipt (the REVIEW-PASS comment marker) as the review
evidence, blocks on a missing or stale receipt routed to /review-change, and
independently evaluates only the delivery gates below.
Turn contract — verify before ending the turn
✓ The review receipt was consumed from one PR snapshot: `headRefOid` + newest
matching `review-change:pass` marker fetched together; absent or any SHA
mismatch → blocker routed to `/review-change`, current → its scope/axes/
acceptance coverage/manual checks acknowledged without re-review
✓ Upstream lineage was re-verified (current plan receipt + parent spec receipt,
digests recomputed), every obligation row is `verified`/`n/a`, and no planning
finding is open — stale or missing lineage is a blocker, never a formality
✓ The verdict block was printed in the fixed format: `VERDICT: MERGE-READY | BLOCKED` with ranked, evidenced blockers
✓ The PR's FULL URL is printed in the verdict header (the user may be juggling
several projects and agents without a CI monitor — the link in the chat is
the contract, never "PR #N" alone)
✓ MERGE-READY verdict? Then the MERGE-READY comment was POSTED on the PR
(`gh pr comment --body-file` RUN, idempotent by SHA marker) — a comment,
never a commit-message tag. BLOCKED → no comment posted
✓ Nothing was edited, refactored, or merged; merge authorization is outside
this skill and cannot be inherited from docs or an earlier session
✓ No review pass was composed or reconstructed: a missing/stale receipt is a
blocker, never a prompt to re-run review axes from this skill
✓ Closure integrity was evaluated and its result stated explicitly: pass /
blocker / warning / n-a (fix-governed PRs are always n-a; never skipped
silently)
✓ Scope integrity (descope) was evaluated and its result stated explicitly:
pass / blocker / n-a (no unit-referencing issues born on the branch → n-a;
never skipped silently)
✓ Architectural-invariant preservation was evaluated and its result stated
explicitly: pass / blocker / n-a (no project document → n-a; never skipped)
✓ The closing `→ Next:` block is printed as the ABSOLUTE last output
What ships with it
6 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- today Changed · +3 lines f31bc7549746
- 4d ago First seen · 202 lines · 71 tokens per session scan A 94a4c33b6711
audit-pr is a skill published in the GitHub repository gtrabanco/agentic-workflow (20 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 71 tokens to every session and 2,651 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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