Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/gtrabanco/agentic-workflow/verification-contractnpx skills add gtrabanco/agentic-workflow --skill verification-contractgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/gtrabanco/agentic-workflowWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/gtrabanco/agentic-workflow/verification-contract)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/gtrabanco/agentic-workflow/verification-contract"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/gtrabanco/agentic-workflow/verification-contract.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00048 | $0.00795 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00024 | $0.00398 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00010 | $0.00159 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00080 |
Grade A, and why
verification-contract scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured today.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 87 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Verification Contract (internal)
Single owner of the delivery finish line. Planning freezes it; executors may strengthen coverage but cannot move it; review checks the same bytes.
Artifact
Every new feature/fix carries ACCEPTANCE.md beside its SPEC. Copy the matching
repository template. Required parts: Status: frozen; one stable ID per SPEC
criterion; Required outcome; named Validator; literal quality floor; project
commands. Prefer commands, otherwise use read-verified: <evidence> or
manual: <exact observation>. Unlabelled prose is invalid. A planned test may
name its future project runner; it cannot substitute a narrower runner later.
Validator stability. A validator must never gate on a surface other workflow actors mutate — the branch diff as a whole, the session log, progress entries, review ledgers, or forge state — because any out-of-unit commit (a session-log append, another unit's fold) then re-fails a frozen criterion on a finished unit and re-opens its review loop. Grep the unit's own files and outputs; a diff-based validator enumerates the unit's paths or excludes the workflow-mutated surfaces explicitly (docs/LOGS.md, the unit's own docs directory, harness/toolstate).
Freeze and receipt
At first execution run git hash-object <unit>/ACCEPTANCE.md and append to the
unit progress file:
## Acceptance receipt v1
- Manifest: <path> · Blob: <sha> · Status: frozen · Verified: <date>
Before every phase and final review, recompute it. Exact match continues; missing/mismatched evidence stops before edits:
ACCEPTANCE GATE — <unit> BLOCKED
Expected blob: <sha|missing> · Actual: <sha|missing>
Reason: the frozen finish line is missing or changed.
→ Next: restore the frozen manifest, or obtain explicit user approval for a
SPEC amendment and replacement manifest; then write a fresh receipt
· never edit tests, commands, or acceptance to make the current candidate pass
A legitimate change requires, in order: explicit user approval; dated SPEC
## Amendments row; replacement manifest; committed fresh receipt. The
executor never self-authorizes it.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- today Changed · +9 lines c4181892a695
- 4d ago First seen · 78 lines · 48 tokens per session scan A 02141fe84d20
verification-contract is a skill published in the GitHub repository gtrabanco/agentic-workflow (20 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 48 tokens to every session and 795 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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