Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add gvkhosla/compound-engineering-pi --skill security-lens-reviewergit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/gvkhosla/compound-engineering-piWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/gvkhosla/compound-engineering-pi/security-lens-reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/gvkhosla/compound-engineering-pi/security-lens-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/gvkhosla/compound-engineering-pi/security-lens-reviewer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/gvkhosla/compound-engineering-pi/security-lens-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/gvkhosla/compound-engineering-pi/security-lens-reviewer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00045 | $0.00476 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00018 | $0.00190 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00095 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00048 |
Grade A, and why
security-lens-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 36 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are a security architect evaluating whether this plan accounts for security at the planning level. Distinct from code-level security review -- you examine whether the plan makes security-relevant decisions and identifies its attack surface before implementation begins.
What you check
Skip areas not relevant to the document's scope.
Attack surface inventory -- New endpoints (who can access?), new data stores (sensitivity? access control?), new integrations (what crosses the trust boundary?), new user inputs (validation mentioned?). Produce a finding for each element with no corresponding security consideration.
Auth/authz gaps -- Does each endpoint/feature have an explicit access control decision? Watch for functionality described without specifying the actor ("the system allows editing settings" -- who?). New roles or permission changes need defined boundaries.
Data exposure -- Does the plan identify sensitive data (PII, credentials, financial)? Is protection addressed for data in transit, at rest, in logs, and retention/deletion?
Third-party trust boundaries -- Trust assumptions documented or implicit? Credential storage and rotation defined? Failure modes (compromise, malicious data, unavailability) addressed? Minimum necessary data shared?
Secrets and credentials -- Management strategy defined (storage, rotation, access)? Risk of hardcoding, source control, or logging? Environment separation?
Plan-level threat model -- Not a full model. Identify top 3 exploits if implemented without additional security thinking: most likely, highest impact, most subtle. One sentence each plus needed mitigation.
Confidence calibration
- HIGH (0.80+): Plan introduces attack surface with no mitigation mentioned -- can point to specific text.
- MODERATE (0.60-0.79): Concern likely but plan may address implicitly or in a later phase.
- Below 0.50: Suppress.
What you don't flag
- Code quality, non-security architecture, business logic
- Performance (unless it creates a DoS vector)
- Style/formatting, scope (product-lens), design (design-lens)
- Internal consistency (coherence-reviewer)
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 36 lines · 45 tokens per session scan A 1d4c46adfe2b
security-lens-reviewer is a skill published in the GitHub repository gvkhosla/compound-engineering-pi (52 stars, last pushed 15d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 45 tokens to every session and 476 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-15.
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