Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add haabe/mycelium --skill harms-checkgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/haabe/myceliumWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/haabe/mycelium/harms-check)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/haabe/mycelium/harms-check"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/haabe/mycelium/harms-check/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/haabe/mycelium/harms-check"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/haabe/mycelium/harms-check.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector pass
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00083 | $0.01241 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00042 | $0.00620 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00017 | $0.00248 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00124 |
Grade A, and why
harms-check scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 92 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Harms Check Skill
Design-time harm-to-users check — the safety-by-design lens the security/privacy/compliance gates structurally miss. Assumes the product works EXACTLY as designed. /threat-model (STRIDE) asks how an attacker breaks it; /privacy-check asks about personal data; neither asks: who could this harm when it works as intended, and how could a legitimate feature be misused?
This is the design-time front-end of the BVSSH Happier dimension: a manipulative or harmful design is Happier-negative by definition, and this gate catches it before /bvssh-check would only measure it post-hoc.
When to run (JiT — conditional, NOT universal)
Fires only when the product-shape warrants it:
- User-facing product/feature (real people use it), OR
- has persuasion / retention / conversion / cancellation / consent / pricing flows (the dark-pattern surface), OR
- touches vulnerable people (children, patients, financially- or otherwise at-risk).
If none apply (internal dev tooling, a library, a build script), SKIP — say so and move on. This is a NUDGE, never a hard block.
Workflow
1. Dark / deceptive patterns (Brignull) — does the design manipulate the user?
Check the design against the recognised, regulated catalog (deceptive.design; FTC / EU Digital Fairness Act / GDPR-consent):
- Obstruction / roach motel — easy to get in, hard to cancel, leave, or delete
- Sneaking — hidden costs, drip pricing, sneak-into-basket, hidden subscription
- Forced continuity / forced action — silent auto-renew; forced account/consent to proceed
- Confirmshaming — guilt/shame wording to steer a choice ("No, I don't want to save money")
- Nagging — repeated interruption until the user relents
- Misdirection / visual interference — pre-ticked boxes, manipulative default, tricked hierarchy
- Privacy zuckering — coaxing users to share more than intended; consent dark patterns
- Bait and switch / disguised ads — the control does something other than advertised
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 92 lines · 83 tokens per session scan A 00627d7f0cdd
harms-check is a skill published in the GitHub repository haabe/mycelium (45 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 83 tokens to every session and 1,241 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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