Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add hamr0/liteagents --skill refactorgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/hamr0/liteagentsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/hamr0/liteagents/refactor)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/hamr0/liteagents/refactor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/hamr0/liteagents/refactor/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/hamr0/liteagents/refactor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/hamr0/liteagents/refactor.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00010 | $0.03170 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00004 | $0.01268 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00634 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00001 | $0.00317 |
Grade A, and why
refactor scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 20d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
Copies of this mod
1 near-identical copy found in the catalogue:
- refactor — 100% identical, 0 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 229 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Refactor $ARGUMENTS. A targeted refactor includes the performance pass below — it is on by default, not a separate command.
Guardrails
- Spawn a worker, mid tier stated explicitly (omitted inherits the parent's, not the balanced one; not cheapest/fastest either — judgment degrades there; never a vendor model name). Fall back to running inline if your tool has no subagent mechanism.
- Escalate, never assume. Anything you cannot decide, cannot verify, or that this spec does not cover → stop and report it to the orchestrator (the main session). Never improvise, never widen scope, never fix a side issue you noticed along the way.
- The worker does the work itself — no delegation. The fixer must not spawn subagents of its own. Every edit it reports, and every test run it cites, has to be one it made or ran with its own tool calls: a relayed "I fixed it and the suite is green" from a sub-worker is hearsay, and this command's whole output is the claim that a change landed and the tests still pass. A fix that delegates its work is a report about a report.
- The HITL gates below belong to the orchestrator, not the worker. A subagent cannot hold a conversation with the user, so it cannot run a gate that ends in stop and ask. When one trips — a failing test, a crossed public API boundary, a change bigger than the bullet asked for — the worker stops there and hands the situation back, with the options and its reasoning but no choice made. The orchestrator asks. A worker that picks revert / patch / update-test on the user's behalf has answered a question it was never allowed to ask.
- Edit only what a surviving bullet names. Ledger mode's scope is the bullets that survive revalidation, one change per bullet — not the neighbouring code, not the formatting, not a second finding noticed on the way past. Anything else goes back to the orchestrator to become a new bullet.
- Prove the blast radius with two checks, because neither sees what the
other does.
git status --porcelainat exit must list only files a surviving bullet named — that is this command's scope guarantee, and unlike/branch-reviewit is not expected to be empty. It cannot police the memory directory:.amp/is normally gitignored, so porcelain stays empty whether you deleted a fixed bullet, wrote nothing, or overwroteMEMORY.md. So also hash the files there before you start and again before you report:
and show the comparison: onlyfind .amp/remember -maxdepth 1 -type f -exec md5sum {} + | sort -k2fix-ledger.mdmay differ.last-review.mdin particular is/branch-review's to write — a fixer that touches it forges the gate that judges its own work.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 20d ago Changed · +12 lines 0e3faa99cad9
- 21d ago Changed · +7 lines 543a72af722c
- 1mo ago Changed · +9 lines fbad7a02368d
- 1mo ago Changed · +31 lines 978c21bd4306
- 1mo ago First seen · 170 lines · 10 tokens per session scan A 4064aea25551
refactor is a skill published in the GitHub repository hamr0/liteagents (26 stars, last pushed today), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 10 tokens to every session and 3,170 once invoked, about $0.0000 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-05.
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windbg-kernel-bugcheck-triage
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windbg-kernel-verifier-triage
Use when a kernel dump contains Driver Verifier violations; inspect flags, bugcheck subcodes, and available I/O shadow state. Not for Application Verifier user-mode stops or inferring a violation from enabled flags alone.
windbg-user-exception-triage
Use when a native C/C++ app, service, or user-mode driver host (including UMDF) crashes with a structured exception in a dump or WinDbg session, including native faults inside managed processes. Not for managed .NET exceptions, WinUI/XAML app errors, or kernel bugchecks.
windbg-user-heap-corruption-investigation
Use when an app, service, or user-mode driver host heap fails or Application Verifier detects corruption; inspect history and bounds. Not for kernel pool corruption or ordinary OOM.
windbg-user-ttd-reverse-debugging-triage
Use when an app, service, or user-mode driver host TTD recording is available and earlier calls, writes, or lifetimes matter. Not for kernel replay or history from a normal dump.