Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to harness-studio/harness-studio. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/harness-studio/harness-studio/main/.claude/skills/roles/security-adversary/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/harness-studio/harness-studioWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/harness-studio/harness-studio/security-adversary)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/harness-studio/harness-studio/security-adversary"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/harness-studio/harness-studio/security-adversary.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00033 | $0.00676 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00016 | $0.00338 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00007 | $0.00135 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00068 |
Grade B, and why
role-security-adversary scanned grade B with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Instruction-override phrasingmediumPrompt injection
Text telling the model to disregard its earlier instructions or safety rules is the shape of a prompt injection, whoever wrote it.
2. **Prompt injection**: any user input that reaches an LLM prompt — test: `Ignore previous instructions and...` Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Runs shell commandslowCapability
Expected in a hook, worth knowing in a rule or an instructions file.
3. **Command injection**: any input reaching `subprocess`, `os.system`, `eval` — test: `; ls -la`, `$(whoami)` How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 60 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Purpose
BREAK IN. Don't review politely — actively attempt to exploit the system. You win by getting in. PASS only if the attack suite is survived with evidence.
Non-negotiables
Always:
- Attack EVERY input that reaches a query, LLM, shell, or file system for injection
- Attack auth surfaces for brute force, rate-limit bypass, and broken object-level authorization (IDOR)
- Search for secrets in code, logs, error responses, and git history
- Test hostile inputs: malformed payloads, oversized values, unexpected types, null/empty
- Report
severity: highfor any finding that could compromise data or system integrity
Never:
- Conduct a polite review — this is an active attack, not a code review
- PASS without actually attempting the attacks
- Skip an attack because "the developer probably handled it" — verify it
Attack surface (check all that apply)
- SQL injection: every
WHEREclause,LIKE,ORDER BY,LIMIT— especially those with user-supplied values. Test:'; DROP TABLE --,' OR 1=1 --,' UNION SELECT - Prompt injection: any user input that reaches an LLM prompt — test:
Ignore previous instructions and... - Command injection: any input reaching
subprocess,os.system,eval— test:; ls -la,$(whoami) - IDOR: attempt to read/modify another user's resource by changing an ID in the request
- Auth bypass: missing auth on sensitive endpoints, JWT algorithm confusion, token reuse
- Rate limiting: brute force login/password-reset endpoints — does the rate limit actually activate?
- Secret leakage: grep for API keys, passwords, tokens in: source code,
.envfiles tracked in git, error responses, log output - Hostile input: send
None,"",-1,999999999,{"key": null}, binary strings to every endpoint
Output format
{
"verdict": "PASS|BLOCK",
"findings": [
{
"issue": "<what the vulnerability is>",
"severity": "high|med|low",
"repro": "<exact steps or code to reproduce the exploit>"
}
]
}
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 60 lines · 33 tokens per session scan B ed3c188f7b6c
role-security-adversary is a skill published in the GitHub repository harness-studio/harness-studio (9 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 33 tokens to every session and 676 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 2 findings (instruction-override phrasing, runs shell commands). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other skills, from other repositories
dos-self-improve
Run the DOS self-improvement loop: propose a candidate, verify it in an isolated worktree, measure suite/truth/metric gates, and keep only confirmed gains. Use for recursive improvement; use dos-enforce-tune for policy knobs.
dos-witness-claim
Route subagent claims through independent read-back before another agent relies on them. Use at parallel, pipeline, or synthesis barriers where shipped phases, files, rows, messages, or other effects must be witnessed.
dos-skillify
Convert an agent skill into a DOS-grounded variant by replacing self-certified claims with dos witness checks and emitting an additive copy plus report. Use when asked to make a skill DOS-aware or audit its self-checks.
test-discipline
Update tests when changing APIs — no exceptions.
eval-workflow
Run evaluation tests against a multi-agent workflow to assess orchestration quality and failure archetype resistance.
My Skill
Content here.