Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add HermeticOrmus/LibreSecOps-Claude-Code --skill aws-s3-securitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/HermeticOrmus/LibreSecOps-Claude-CodeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/aws-s3-security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/aws-s3-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/aws-s3-security/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/aws-s3-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/aws-s3-security.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00000 | $0.01971 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00986 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00394 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00197 |
Grade A, and why
aws-s3-security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 219 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
AWS S3 Security
S3 bucket security configurations, access control models, encryption patterns, and data exposure prevention.
Knowledge Base
S3 Access Control Layers
S3 has multiple overlapping access control mechanisms. Understanding the hierarchy prevents misconfigurations:
- Block Public Access (Account level) -- Master switch. If enabled at account level, overrides all bucket-level settings. This is your first line of defense.
- Block Public Access (Bucket level) -- Per-bucket controls. Four independent settings:
BlockPublicAcls-- Rejects PUT requests with public ACLsIgnorePublicAcls-- Ignores existing public ACLsBlockPublicPolicy-- Rejects bucket policies that grant public accessRestrictPublicBuckets-- Restricts access to bucket with public policies to AWS principals only
- Bucket Policy -- JSON policies attached to the bucket. Most flexible control.
- ACLs (Legacy) -- Predates bucket policies. AWS recommends disabling ACLs entirely (S3 Object Ownership set to "Bucket owner enforced").
- IAM Policies -- Control what IAM principals can do with S3.
- Access Points -- Named network endpoints with their own access policies, scoped to specific prefixes.
- VPC Endpoint Policies -- Control which buckets can be accessed from a VPC endpoint.
S3 Encryption Models
| Type | Key | Description | Use Case |
|---|---|---|---|
| SSE-S3 | AWS managed, auto-rotated | S3 manages everything | Default encryption, no key management overhead |
| SSE-KMS | Customer managed or AWS managed KMS key | Separate key management, audit trail via CloudTrail | When you need key rotation control, access auditing, or cross-account key sharing |
| SSE-C | Customer provided per request | Customer sends key with each request | Regulatory requirement to hold keys outside AWS |
| Client-side | Customer managed entirely | Encrypt before upload | Zero-trust of AWS, end-to-end encryption |
Default recommendation: SSE-KMS with a customer-managed key. It provides the best balance of security, auditability, and operational simplicity.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 219 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A 28f75589a065
aws-s3-security is a skill published in the GitHub repository HermeticOrmus/LibreSecOps-Claude-Code (4 stars, last pushed 3mo ago), licensed MIT. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 1,971 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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