Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/container-runtime-securitynpx skills add HermeticOrmus/LibreSecOps-Claude-Code --skill container-runtime-securitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/HermeticOrmus/LibreSecOps-Claude-CodeWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00000 | $0.02744 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00000 | $0.01372 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00549 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00274 |
Grade A, and why
container-runtime-security scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
--health-cmd "wget -qO- http://localhost:8080/health || exit 1" \ How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 279 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Container Runtime Security
Runtime isolation mechanisms, Linux capabilities, seccomp profiles, AppArmor, and namespace configuration for containers.
Knowledge Base
Linux Kernel Features Used by Containers
Containers are not a kernel primitive. They are a userspace abstraction built on real kernel features:
| Feature | Purpose | Container Impact |
|---|---|---|
| Namespaces | Isolation of system resources (PID, NET, MNT, UTS, IPC, USER, CGROUP) | Each container gets its own view of processes, network, filesystem mounts |
| cgroups | Resource limiting and accounting (CPU, memory, I/O, PIDs) | Prevents a container from consuming all host resources |
| Capabilities | Fine-grained subdivision of root privileges (37 capabilities in Linux) | Containers can run as "root" but without dangerous capabilities |
| Seccomp | System call filtering (BPF-based) | Blocks dangerous syscalls like mount, reboot, kexec_load |
| AppArmor/SELinux | Mandatory Access Control (MAC) | Restricts file access, network operations, capabilities |
| User namespaces | Map container UID 0 to unprivileged host UID | Container "root" is not host root |
Linux Capabilities Breakdown
Docker drops most capabilities by default, keeping only these 14:
CHOWN, DAC_OVERRIDE, FOWNER, FSETID, KILL, SETGID, SETUID, SETPCAP,
NET_BIND_SERVICE, NET_RAW, SYS_CHROOT, MKNOD, AUDIT_WRITE, SETFCAP
Dangerous capabilities to NEVER add:
| Capability | Risk |
|---|---|
SYS_ADMIN |
Near-complete root access. Allows mounting filesystems, using unshare, BPF operations. The "god capability." |
SYS_PTRACE |
Trace any process. Can inject code into other containers sharing a PID namespace. |
SYS_RAWIO |
Raw I/O port access, can modify kernel memory via /dev/mem. |
DAC_READ_SEARCH |
Bypass file read permissions. Can read any file on mounted filesystems. |
NET_ADMIN |
Full network control. Can modify routing tables, firewall rules, capture traffic. |
SYS_MODULE |
Load kernel modules. Instant host compromise. |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 279 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A cdc3dd6041ea
container-runtime-security is a skill published in the GitHub repository HermeticOrmus/LibreSecOps-Claude-Code (4 stars, last pushed 3mo ago), licensed MIT. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 2,744 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other skills, from other repositories
building-devsecops-pipeline-with-gitlab-ci
Design and implement a comprehensive DevSecOps pipeline in GitLab CI/CD integrating SAST, DAST, container scanning, dependency scanning, and secret detection.
implementing-devsecops-security-scanning
Integrates Static Application Security Testing (SAST), Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST), and Software Composition Analysis (SCA) into CI/CD pipelines using open-source tools. Covers Semgrep for SAST, Trivy for SCA and container scanning, OWASP ZAP for DAST, and Gitleaks for secrets detection. Activates for…
implementing-runtime-application-self-protection
Deploy Runtime Application Self-Protection (RASP) agents to detect and block attacks from within application runtime, covering OpenRASP integration, attack pattern detection, and security policy configuration for Java and Python web applications.
audit-production-readiness
Audit a repository or service for release-blocking bugs, security, data/privacy, AI-agent, supply-chain, operability, and scale risks. Use for deep code audits, threat models, pre-production reviews, vulnerability triage, incidents, defensive investigation, release gates, or evidence-based 10k-to-1M-user readiness.
engineer-production-systems
Design, write, refactor, or optimize production code so it is secure, correct, resource-bounded, observable, and maintainable. Use for full-stack features, APIs, databases, AI/RAG/MCP tools, CPU/RAM/latency work, 10k-to-1M-user planning, or authorized kernel, browser, parser, protocol, and defensive…
best-in-code
Run an adaptive, reusable software-delivery harness across AI models with project management, planning, research, design, frontend, backend, QA, durable scoped memory, capability fallbacks, bounded discovery, and human approval gates. Use when the user invokes Harness or asks for an end-to-end build, review, bug…