Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add HermeticOrmus/LibreSecOps-Claude-Code --skill gcp-iam-patternsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/HermeticOrmus/LibreSecOps-Claude-CodeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/gcp-iam-patterns)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/gcp-iam-patterns"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/gcp-iam-patterns.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00000 | $0.02112 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00000 | $0.01056 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00422 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00211 |
Grade A, and why
gcp-iam-patterns scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 186 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
GCP IAM Patterns
Secure GCP IAM patterns, custom role design, IAM conditions, Workload Identity Federation, and the GCP permission model.
Knowledge Base
GCP IAM Model Fundamentals
GCP IAM works through bindings that connect principals to roles on resources. The key concepts:
- Principal: Who (user, group, service account, domain, allUsers, allAuthenticatedUsers)
- Role: A collection of permissions (e.g.,
roles/storage.objectViewerincludesstorage.objects.getandstorage.objects.list) - Resource: Where the binding applies (organization, folder, project, or individual resource)
- Binding: The association of principal + role + resource, optionally with conditions
Inheritance flows downward. A binding at the organization level applies to every folder, project, and resource beneath it. A binding at the project level applies to every resource in that project. Bindings are additive -- you cannot remove an inherited permission at a lower level (but you can use deny policies).
Role Types
| Type | Examples | When to Use |
|---|---|---|
| Basic | roles/owner, roles/editor, roles/viewer |
Almost never. Overly broad. Legacy. |
| Predefined | roles/storage.objectViewer, roles/compute.networkAdmin |
Default choice. Google-maintained, least-privilege per service. |
| Custom | projects/my-proj/roles/customRole |
When predefined roles include permissions you do not want to grant. |
Critical rule: Never assign basic roles to service accounts. roles/editor on a service account grants write access to nearly every service in the project.
IAM Deny Policies
Introduced to address the "additive-only" limitation. Deny policies are evaluated before allow policies and cannot be overridden:
# Deny policy: prevent any principal from disabling audit logs
deniedPermissions:
- "cloudaudit.googleapis.com/activityLogs.disable"
- "logging.googleapis.com/logEntries.delete"
deniedPrincipals:
- "principalSet://goog/public:all"
exceptionPrincipals:
- "principal://iam.googleapis.com/projects/-/serviceAccounts/[email protected]"
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 6d ago First seen · 186 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A e78e21d24ba4
gcp-iam-patterns is a skill published in the GitHub repository HermeticOrmus/LibreSecOps-Claude-Code (4 stars, last pushed 3mo ago), licensed MIT. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 2,112 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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