Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add HermeticOrmus/LibreSecOps-Claude-Code --skill injection-preventiongit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/HermeticOrmus/LibreSecOps-Claude-CodeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/injection-prevention)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/injection-prevention"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/injection-prevention/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/injection-prevention"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/injection-prevention.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00000 | $0.02458 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00000 | $0.01229 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00492 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00246 |
Grade A, and why
injection-prevention scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Runs shell commandslowCapability
Expected in a hook, worth knowing in a rule or an instructions file.
os.system(f"convert {filename} output.png") How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 248 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Injection Prevention
Comprehensive injection prevention patterns for SQL, XSS, command injection, path traversal, LDAP, and template injection across all major languages and frameworks.
Knowledge Base
The Fundamental Principle
Injection occurs when untrusted data is interpreted as code or structure by a downstream processor. The universal prevention is to ensure the processor can distinguish data from code. This is achieved through:
- Parameterization -- Sending data through a separate channel from code (prepared statements, argument arrays)
- Context-aware encoding -- Transforming data so it is inert in the target context (HTML encoding, URL encoding)
- Allowlist validation -- Accepting only data that matches a known-safe pattern (enum values, regex matching)
Denylist filtering (blocking known-bad characters) is almost always insufficient because there are too many encoding variations and bypass techniques.
SQL Injection
Root cause: User input concatenated into SQL query strings.
Prevention by language:
# VULNERABLE
cursor.execute(f"SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '{name}'")
# SECURE - Parameterized query
cursor.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = %s", (name,))
# SECURE - Django ORM (parameterized by default)
User.objects.filter(name=name)
# VULNERABLE - Django raw with string formatting
User.objects.raw(f"SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '{name}'")
# SECURE - Django raw with params
User.objects.raw("SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = %s", [name])
// VULNERABLE
db.query(`SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '${name}'`);
// SECURE - Parameterized (pg library)
db.query('SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = $1', [name]);
// SECURE - Prisma ORM (parameterized by default)
prisma.user.findMany({ where: { name } });
// VULNERABLE - Sequelize literal
sequelize.query(`SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '${name}'`);
// SECURE - Sequelize parameterized
sequelize.query('SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = :name', {
replacements: { name }
});
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 6d ago First seen · 248 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A 74cb1b55adb7
injection-prevention is a skill published in the GitHub repository HermeticOrmus/LibreSecOps-Claude-Code (4 stars, last pushed 3mo ago), licensed MIT. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 2,458 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (runs shell commands). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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