Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add HermeticOrmus/LibreSecOps-Claude-Code --skill ioc-patternsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/HermeticOrmus/LibreSecOps-Claude-CodeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/ioc-patterns)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/ioc-patterns"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/ioc-patterns/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/ioc-patterns"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/ioc-patterns.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00053 | $0.02349 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00021 | $0.00940 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00011 | $0.00470 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00235 |
Grade A, and why
ioc-patterns scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 212 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
IOC Patterns
Taxonomy of indicator of compromise types, extraction techniques, quality assessment, and structured formatting for threat intelligence sharing.
Knowledge Base
Indicator Taxonomy
The Pyramid of Pain (David Bianco, 2013) ranks indicator types by how much effort it costs an adversary to change them:
/ TTPs \ <- Hardest to change (most valuable)
/ Tools \
/ Artifacts \
/ Domain Names \
/ IP Addresses \
/ Hash Values \ <- Easiest to change (least valuable)
Hash Values (Trivial to change)
- MD5 (32 hex chars) -- collision-prone, still used for lookup compatibility
- SHA-1 (40 hex chars) -- deprecated for security, still common in threat intel
- SHA-256 (64 hex chars) -- standard for reliable identification
- ssdeep (fuzzy hash) -- identifies similar files despite minor changes
- TLSH (Trend Micro Locality Sensitive Hash) -- better than ssdeep for many use cases
- Imphash (PE import hash) -- groups samples by import table, survives recompilation
IP Addresses (Easy to change)
- C2 server addresses
- Exfiltration endpoints
- Scanning/reconnaissance sources
- Proxy/relay infrastructure
- Note: Shared hosting, CDNs, and cloud IPs can cause false positives
Domain Names (Moderate to change)
- C2 domains (registered or compromised)
- DGA (Domain Generation Algorithm) domains -- daily/hourly generated
- Staging/distribution domains
- Exfiltration domains (including DNS tunneling)
- Subdomain patterns (randomized, sequential, encoded)
Network Artifacts (Moderate to change)
- JA3/JA3S hashes (TLS client/server fingerprints)
- JARM fingerprints (active TLS server fingerprinting)
- HTTP headers and patterns (User-Agent, custom headers)
- URI patterns and paths
- Certificate details (subject, issuer, serial, thumbprint)
- DNS query patterns (record types, query frequency, response sizes)
Host Artifacts (Harder to change)
- File paths (drop locations, staging directories)
- Registry keys and values
- Mutex/named event names
- Scheduled task configurations
- Service names and descriptions
- Named pipe names
- WMI subscriptions
- Process command-line patterns
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 12d ago Changed · +5 lines · +53 tokens per session 631ece335d2a
- 1mo ago First seen · 207 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A a39e83548503
ioc-patterns is a skill published in the GitHub repository HermeticOrmus/LibreSecOps-Claude-Code (4 stars, last pushed 9d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 53 tokens to every session and 2,349 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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