Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add HermeticOrmus/LibreSecOps-Claude-Code --skill stride-methodologygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/HermeticOrmus/LibreSecOps-Claude-CodeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/stride-methodology)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/stride-methodology"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/stride-methodology/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/stride-methodology"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/stride-methodology.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00054 | $0.02228 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00022 | $0.00891 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00011 | $0.00446 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00223 |
Grade C, and why
stride-methodology scanned grade C with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Cloud metadata endpointhighServer-side request forgery
One request to 169.254.169.254 can return temporary IAM credentials.
- Metadata service access (169.254.169.254) from compromised instances How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 231 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
STRIDE Methodology
Detailed STRIDE analysis patterns with threat catalogs for common architectural components including web applications, APIs, databases, message queues, and cloud services.
Knowledge Base
STRIDE Overview
STRIDE was developed at Microsoft as a mnemonic for categorizing security threats. Each letter represents a category of threat that violates a specific security property:
| Threat | Violated Property | Question |
|---|---|---|
| Spoofing | Authentication | Can someone pretend to be someone/something else? |
| Tampering | Integrity | Can someone modify data they shouldn't? |
| Repudiation | Non-repudiation | Can someone deny they did something? |
| Information Disclosure | Confidentiality | Can someone access data they shouldn't? |
| Denial of Service | Availability | Can someone prevent legitimate access? |
| Elevation of Privilege | Authorization | Can someone do something they're not permitted to? |
STRIDE-per-Element Application
Different DFD element types are susceptible to different STRIDE categories:
| DFD Element | S | T | R | I | D | E |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| External Entity | X | |||||
| Process | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Data Flow | X | X | X | |||
| Data Store | X | X | X | X |
This matrix guides the analysis -- you don't need to consider Elevation of Privilege for a data store, but you do for a process.
Threat Catalogs by Component
Web Application (Process)
Spoofing:
- Session hijacking via stolen session tokens (XSS, network sniffing)
- Credential stuffing using leaked credential databases
- Cookie theft via subdomain takeover
- CSRF forcing authenticated users to perform unintended actions
- OAuth token theft via redirect URI manipulation
Tampering:
- SQL injection modifying database records
- Parameter tampering (hidden fields, cookies, headers)
- Mass assignment modifying protected model attributes
- Request smuggling exploiting parser inconsistencies
- Template injection executing server-side code
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 12d ago Changed · +5 lines · +54 tokens per session scan B → C c33974049bb1
- 1mo ago First seen · 226 lines · 0 tokens per session scan B 9ead363c16f9
stride-methodology is a skill published in the GitHub repository HermeticOrmus/LibreSecOps-Claude-Code (4 stars, last pushed 9d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 54 tokens to every session and 2,228 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it C with 1 finding (cloud metadata endpoint). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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