Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add HermeticOrmus/LibreSecOps-Claude-Code --skill threat-modelinggit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/HermeticOrmus/LibreSecOps-Claude-CodeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/threat-modeling)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/threat-modeling"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/threat-modeling/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/threat-modeling"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/threat-modeling.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00073 | $0.01747 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00029 | $0.00699 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00015 | $0.00349 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00175 |
Grade A, and why
threat-modeling scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 174 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Threat modeling pattern library
STRIDE quick reference
| Letter | Threat | Common mitigations |
|---|---|---|
| Spoofing | Impersonation | Authentication (MFA), mutual TLS, signed tokens |
| Tampering | Unauthorized modification | Integrity checks (HMAC), signed data, immutable audit logs |
| Repudiation | Action denial | Audit logs with non-repudiation (signed entries), trusted timestamps |
| Information Disclosure | Data leak | Encryption at rest + in transit, least-privilege access, data minimization |
| Denial of Service | Availability loss | Rate limiting, auto-scaling, circuit breakers, DDoS protection |
| Elevation of Privilege | Gaining unauthorized capability | RBAC + ABAC, privilege separation, mandatory access control |
Trust boundary checklist
Common trust boundaries to enumerate:
- User → CDN/edge
- Edge → application
- Application → datastore
- Application → external API (per integration)
- Application → message queue
- Internal service A → internal service B
- Build pipeline → production
- Operator → infrastructure
Each crossing is a potential threat surface.
DREAD scoring guide
For each dimension, 1 = minimal, 10 = maximum:
Damage: nothing → bankruptcy Reproducibility: requires precise conditions → trivially repeatable Exploitability: requires nation-state resources → script-kiddie Affected users: single user → everyone Discoverability: never found → publicly documented
Use 1-10 scale; average to a final score. > 7 critical, 5-7 high, 3-5 medium, < 3 accept-and-monitor.
Common STRIDE × component pairs
Web app frontend
- S: phishing replicas, OAuth flow tampering
- T: XSS modifying displayed data
- I: secrets in JS bundle, session token in URL
- D: client-side resource exhaustion
- E: privilege escalation via client-side bypass
REST API
- S: token theft + replay
- T: request tampering, parameter pollution
- R: missing audit logs
- I: BOLA (Broken Object Level Authorization), excessive data exposure
- D: unbounded query, ReDoS
- E: BFLA (Broken Function Level Authorization), mass assignment
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 12d ago First seen · 174 lines · 73 tokens per session scan A 711c34af761e
threat-modeling is a skill published in the GitHub repository HermeticOrmus/LibreSecOps-Claude-Code (4 stars, last pushed 9d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 73 tokens to every session and 1,747 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-10-01.
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