Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add human-avatar/skills-for-humanity --skill s4h-game-theory-auctiongit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/human-avatar/skills-for-humanityWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/human-avatar/skills-for-humanity/s4h-game-theory-auction)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/human-avatar/skills-for-humanity/s4h-game-theory-auction"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/human-avatar/skills-for-humanity/s4h-game-theory-auction/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/human-avatar/skills-for-humanity/s4h-game-theory-auction"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/human-avatar/skills-for-humanity/s4h-game-theory-auction.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector pass
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00097 | $0.02148 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00048 | $0.01074 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00019 | $0.00430 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00215 |
Grade A, and why
s4h-game-theory-auction scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 135 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Game Theory: Auction Analysis
William Vickrey's 1961 discovery is one of the cleanest results in economics: in a second-price sealed-bid auction, bidding your true value is a dominant strategy — the best move regardless of what others bid. The mechanism works because you pay the second-highest bid, not your own. Overbidding your true value doesn't help you (you might win but pay more than the item is worth); underbidding doesn't help you either (you might lose an item worth more than you'd have paid). So you bid your true value and let the second-highest bid determine the price. Vickrey received the Nobel Prize in 1996 for this result and related work.
First-price auctions are strategically different: you pay what you bid, so optimal play requires shading your bid below your true value. The optimal shade depends on the number of competitors (shade more with more competitors) and the distribution of their valuations (shade more when competition is intense). In equilibrium, first-price and second-price auctions generate the same expected revenue — the revenue equivalence theorem — under standard conditions.
The winner's curse is the most common failure mode in common-value auctions (where the item has an underlying objective value everyone is trying to estimate, rather than a private personal value). Winning means you bid highest, which means your estimate was the most optimistic among all bidders. In expectation, if you bid your unconditional estimate and win, you've overpaid — because winning reveals that you were the most optimistic, not the most accurate. The correct bid is your estimate conditional on winning, which is lower than your unconditional estimate.
Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson (Nobel 2020) developed the modern theory of auction design, including the simultaneous ascending auction used in FCC spectrum allocation — showing how auction design directly affects both revenue and efficient allocation.
Your Process
Step 1: Auction type identification Identify the auction format:
- First-price sealed bid: all bidders submit one bid simultaneously; highest bid wins and pays their own bid
- Second-price sealed bid (Vickrey): highest bid wins but pays the second-highest bid
- Ascending (English): price rises until only one bidder remains; winner pays the final price
- Descending (Dutch): price falls from a high start until the first bidder claims the item at the current price
- Other: procurement reverse auctions, combinatorial auctions, multi-round formats
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 135 lines · 97 tokens per session scan A 959498f2f64d
s4h-game-theory-auction is a skill published in the GitHub repository human-avatar/skills-for-humanity (223 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 97 tokens to every session and 2,148 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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