Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add iradoweck/antigravity-awesome-skills --skill ai-security-hardeninggit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/iradoweck/antigravity-awesome-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/iradoweck/antigravity-awesome-skills/ai-security-hardening)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/iradoweck/antigravity-awesome-skills/ai-security-hardening"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/iradoweck/antigravity-awesome-skills/ai-security-hardening/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/iradoweck/antigravity-awesome-skills/ai-security-hardening"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/iradoweck/antigravity-awesome-skills/ai-security-hardening.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00029 | $0.02766 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00012 | $0.01106 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00553 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00277 |
Grade A, and why
ai-security-hardening scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 10d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
This is a copy
100% identical to ai-security-hardening — 0 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 336 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
AI Security Hardening
Secure LLM and AI systems against prompt injection, jailbreaks, data leakage, and supply chain threats in production environments.
When to Use This Skill
Use this skill when:
- Deploying an LLM-powered application handling sensitive user data
- Protecting against prompt injection attacks in AI agents
- Implementing output filtering and content moderation
- Securing model weights and API endpoints from theft
- Achieving SOC2 or ISO 27001 compliance for AI systems
AI-Specific Threat Model
Threat Risk Control
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Prompt injection System prompt override Input sanitization, separate context
Data exfiltration PII in model outputs Output filtering, DLP scanning
Jailbreaking Policy bypass Content moderation, guardrails
Model theft Weight extraction via API Rate limiting, access controls
Training data poisoning Backdoored fine-tuned model Dataset validation, provenance
Supply chain attack Malicious model weights Signature verification, scanning
Insecure output XSS/SQLi from LLM response Output encoding, parameterized queries
Prompt-injection indicators and authorization boundaries
Regex indicators have false positives and bypasses. They do not establish a prompt-injection security boundary. Keep untrusted content separate, enforce server-side tool/data authorization independent of model text, minimize accessible secrets and require approval for scoped side effects. The examples below are illustrative detectors, not proof an input or output is safe.
import re
from typing import Optional
INJECTION_PATTERNS = [
r"ignore\s+(all\s+)?(previous|prior|above)\s+instructions",
r"you\s+are\s+now\s+",
r"new\s+instructions?:",
r"system\s+prompt",
r"forget\s+everything",
r"act\s+as\s+",
r"jailbreak",
r"dan\s+mode",
r"<\s*system\s*>",
r"\[INST\]",
]
def detect_prompt_injection(user_input: str) -> tuple[bool, Optional[str]]:
"""Return (is_suspicious, matched_pattern)."""
normalized = user_input.lower().strip()
for pattern in INJECTION_PATTERNS:
if re.search(pattern, normalized, re.IGNORECASE):
return True, pattern
return False, None
def sanitize_user_input(user_input: str, max_length: int = 4000) -> str:
"""Sanitize input before passing to LLM."""
# Truncate
user_input = user_input[:max_length]
# Remove null bytes and control characters
user_input = re.sub(r'[\x00-\x08\x0b\x0c\x0e-\x1f\x7f]', '', user_input)
# Check for injection
suspicious, pattern = detect_prompt_injection(user_input)
if suspicious:
raise ValueError(f"Potential prompt injection detected: {pattern}")
return user_input
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 10d ago Changed · -8 lines 44dd3cc66256
- 1mo ago First seen · 344 lines · 29 tokens per session scan A 2772698def4a
ai-security-hardening is a skill published in the GitHub repository iradoweck/antigravity-awesome-skills (30 stars, last pushed 5d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 29 tokens to every session and 2,766 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 100% identical to ai-security-hardening, differing in 0 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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