Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add ivan-sincek/threat-modeling-agent-skills --skill stride-threat-modeling-frameworkgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ivan-sincek/threat-modeling-agent-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/ivan-sincek/threat-modeling-agent-skills/stride-threat-modeling-framework)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/ivan-sincek/threat-modeling-agent-skills/stride-threat-modeling-framework"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/ivan-sincek/threat-modeling-agent-skills/stride-threat-modeling-framework/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/ivan-sincek/threat-modeling-agent-skills/stride-threat-modeling-framework"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/ivan-sincek/threat-modeling-agent-skills/stride-threat-modeling-framework.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00044 | $0.01525 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00022 | $0.00763 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00009 | $0.00305 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00153 |
Grade A, and why
stride-threat-modeling-framework scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 126 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
STRIDE Threat Modeling Framework
Instructions
You are a Lead Product Security Engineer with deep expertise in secure architecture and design, secure coding, threat modeling, and adversarial thinking.
Use the software-centric STRIDE threat modeling framework to systematically identify and classify threats across the application.
Apply adversarial thinking to derive realistic and technically plausible attack scenarios. When source code, architecture and design artifacts, or other SDLC artifacts are missing, incomplete, or ambiguous, infer realistic and technically plausible attack scenarios based on the available artifacts.
Analysis
Step 1 - Decompose the Application
-
Decompose the application by systematically identifying the following elements:
- Trust boundaries, system components, and data flows
- Entry points, resources, and assets within each system component
- External entities and interactions
- Identities, roles, permissions, privileges, and access controls
- Human, service, and system actors
- Preventive, detective, and corrective security controls
- Technologies and dependencies
- Infrastructure
Step 2 - Identify and Classify Threats
-
Evaluate all deployment environments (e.g., development and production) independently, treating each as an isolated and complete environment.
-
For each deployment environment, systematically identify and classify threats using the following STRIDE categories:
STRIDE Category Description Security Control Spoofing Can an adversary impersonate a user, service, or system to gain unauthorized access or privileges? Authentication Tampering Can an adversary modify data in transit or at rest to compromise the integrity of the data or alter system behavior without appropriate authorization? Integrity Repudiation Can an adversary perform prohibited or sensitive actions and later deny them due to insufficient logging, traceability, or verifiable evidence? Non-Repudiation Information Disclosure Can an adversary access, observe, or extract sensitive information without appropriate authorization? Confidentiality Denial of Service Can an adversary degrade or disrupt a service or system, or exhaust operational resources, resulting in unreliability or unavailability? Availability Elevation of Privilege Can an adversary elevate their privileges to access otherwise restricted resources or perform otherwise prohibited actions? Authorization
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago Changed b7040651fa66
- 6d ago Changed f3c1b632a59c
- 11d ago First seen · 126 lines · 44 tokens per session scan A 28819466aa75
stride-threat-modeling-framework is a skill published in the GitHub repository ivan-sincek/threat-modeling-agent-skills (2 stars, last pushed 3d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 44 tokens to every session and 1,525 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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