Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add jamestorrevillas/dev-skills --skill threat-modelinggit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/jamestorrevillas/dev-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/jamestorrevillas/dev-skills/threat-modeling)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/jamestorrevillas/dev-skills/threat-modeling"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/jamestorrevillas/dev-skills/threat-modeling/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/jamestorrevillas/dev-skills/threat-modeling"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/jamestorrevillas/dev-skills/threat-modeling.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00068 | $0.00778 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00034 | $0.00389 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00014 | $0.00156 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00078 |
Grade A, and why
threat-modeling scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 79 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Threat Modeling
Core Mindset
Think like an attacker, build like a defender.
Threat modeling is done BEFORE building, not after. Security retrofitted is always weaker and more expensive than security designed in.
The STRIDE Framework
For every component, ask: can an attacker do this?
| Threat | Definition | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Spoofing | Pretend to be someone else | Forged JWT token |
| Tampering | Modify data in transit or at rest | SQL injection, request body modification |
| Repudiation | Deny performing an action | No audit log of who deleted a record |
| Information Disclosure | Access data they shouldn't | Over-fetching API, verbose error messages |
| Denial of Service | Make system unavailable | No rate limiting on auth endpoint |
| Elevation of Privilege | Gain unauthorized access level | IDOR (accessing other users' data) |
Threat Modeling Process
1. DEFINE SCOPE — What are we modeling? (feature, service, system)
2. IDENTIFY ASSETS — What are we protecting? (data, services, credentials)
3. DRAW DATA FLOWS — How does data move through the system?
4. IDENTIFY THREATS — Apply STRIDE to each component and data flow
5. ASSESS RISK — Likelihood × Impact for each threat
6. MITIGATE — For each high-risk threat, define a control
7. VERIFY — Confirm controls are implemented and working
Attack Surface Analysis
For any new feature, identify:
- Entry points — Where does user input enter the system?
- Trust boundaries — Where does data cross privilege levels?
- Data stores — What sensitive data is stored and where?
- External dependencies — What third-party services are called?
OWASP Top 10 (Quick Reference)
| # | Threat | Quick Check |
|---|---|---|
| A01 | Broken Access Control | Is every endpoint checking authorization? |
| A02 | Cryptographic Failures | Is sensitive data encrypted at rest and in transit? |
| A03 | Injection | Are all queries parameterized? All inputs validated? |
| A04 | Insecure Design | Was security considered in the design phase? |
| A05 | Security Misconfiguration | Are defaults hardened? Are secrets in env vars? |
| A06 | Vulnerable Components | Are dependencies up to date? Any known CVEs? |
| A07 | Auth Failures | Is auth implemented correctly? Session management secure? |
| A08 | Software Integrity | Are supply chain and build pipeline trusted? |
| A09 | Logging Failures | Are security events logged? Are logs protected? |
| A10 | SSRF | Can users cause server to make requests to internal resources? |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 79 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A 2c1d25e64dcb
threat-modeling is a skill published in the GitHub repository jamestorrevillas/dev-skills (3 stars, last pushed 5mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 68 tokens to every session and 778 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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