What the reviewer found
Queries three plugin registries (api.claude-plugins.dev, claudepluginhub.com, the Anthropic marketplace) and, only after explicit per-item user approval, writes a fetched community SKILL.md/agent.md to disk; the flagged text is validation logic that warns (not executes) on rm -rf/curl|bash inside a candidate file. No auto-install and no code is run, but installing agent-trusted instructions from third-party repos on stars/verified alone is a real supply-chain surface worth knowing about.
installs-software— installs softwarenetwork— calls the vendor’s API
What was read
The file as it ships in jikig-ai/soleur:
.openhands/skills/agent-finder/SKILL.md
What the static scan said
The scan flagged 3things. The reviewer kept 1 and dismissed 2 as false.
SC2Downloads and executes remote code — false positiveRMRecursive force delete — false positiveNETMakes network calls — real
How this review was made
Sonnet 5 read the files above on 7 September 2026 and answered three questions: is it dangerous to whoever installs it, is each scanner finding real, and what should the installer know. The verdict is bound to the file's hash; when the file changes, it is scanned afresh and reviewed again. A script that changes while the definition does not is not re-reviewed — that is a known gap. How the scan and the review work.